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REASSESSINGAPEC’S ROLEAS A
TRANS-REGIONAL ECONOMIC
ARCHITECTURE: LEGALAND
POLICYDIMENSIONS
Pasha L. Hsieh*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the two-decade evolution of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the future prospects for Asian regionalism.
It argues that while APEC retains advantages over competing regional struc-
tures, it should undergo reforms to accelerate the Bogor Goals and ensure its
complementarity with the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article
first analyzes the impact of stake-holding countries’ trade policies on
APEC’s structure and development. By assessing APEC’s soft-law mechan-
ism, it explores APEC’s WTO-plus contributions that reinvigorated the
International Technology Agreement negotiations and improved supply
chain facilitation. APEC’s goal of creating a Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) can overcome structural limitations and serve as an
effective ‘Plan B’ for the Doha Round impasse. Nonetheless, caution should
be given to legal challenges to the pathways to an FTAAP such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Finally, the article calls for reforms that will
enhance APEC’s institution-building and monitoring system. Such reforms
will strengthen APEC’s role under the multilateral trading system and
reenergize the public–private partnership for trans-Pacific integration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Established in 1989, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the
world’s largest trans-regional economic architecture, consisting of 21 econo-
mies in the Pacific Rim.1 APEC represents more than 44% of world trade
and 53% of global gross domestic product (GDP).2 Its growth amounts to
4.3%, which exceeded the world growth of 3.5% in 2012.3 Moreover, the
APEC agenda enhances key stake-holding countries’ trade priorities such as
the USA’s and Russia’s re-engagement with Asia and China’s open-door
policy. Despite its economic significance, APEC is yet to be a free trade
zone as defined by World Trade Organization (WTO) law.4 Lacking an
establishment treaty that confers international legal personality, APEC has
functioned as a de facto institution that promotes economic integration
through the non-binding or soft-law approach.5
APEC reached its zenith when it created the Bogor Goals to accomplish
‘free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific’ for developed and
developing economies by 2010 and 2020, respectively (the 2010/2020
target).6 However, the institution suffered a severe credibility crisis due to
its failure to achieve Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL), com-
pounded by its inability to assist member economies during the Asian finan-
cial crisis in the 1990s.7 Aspirations for APEC rapidly waned. Commentators
criticized that institutional weaknesses had caused APEC’s importance to
1 APEC at a Glance (2012), at 2. For discussion on trans-regionalism, see Richard W. X. Hu,
‘APEC and Future Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture’, 31 American Foreign Policy Interests
12 (2009) 18.
2 APEC at a Glance (2012), at 2.
3 APEC Economic Trends Analysis, 31 May 2012, at 1.
4 For the legal requirements of free trade agreements, see Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), and the enabling clause.
5 Melissa Castan, ‘APEC: International Institution? A Pacific Resolution’, 15 University of
Tasmania Law Review 52 (1996) 54–56; Paul Davidson, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the
Governance of International Economic Relations in Asia’, 24 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of
International Law and Affairs 1 (2006) 15–16. See also Hadi Soesastro, ‘APEC’s Overall
Goals and Objectives, Evolution, and Current Status’, in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC
as an Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asia Studies, 2003) 29, 31–32 (describing APEC’s de facto institutionalization and ‘soft’
negotiations).
6 1994 Leaders’ Declaration: Bogor Declaration – APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of
Common Resolve, 15 November 1994 [Bogor Declaration].
7 See Ippei Yamazawa, ‘APEC’s Achievements and Tasks’, in Riyana Miranti and Denis Hew
(eds), APEC in the 21st Century (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2004) 1, 7–11
(discussing the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) failure); Richard Weixing Hu,
‘APEC: The Challenge of Remaining Relevant’, Opinion, November 2008, http://www.brook
ings.edu/research/opinions/2008/11/apec-hu (visited 1 July 2012) (‘The Asian financial crisis
eventually derailed the [EVSL] process . . . ’).
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dwindle and made it terminally irrelevant to regional economic integration.8
To some extent, this position shifted the focus of international economic
law research from APEC to competing regional structures such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ‘ASEAN plus
N’ framework or the Group of 20 (G20).9 To fill a much needed gap in
the legal literature, the article reassesses APEC’s evolution over the past two
decades and analyzes APEC’s implications for fast-growing Asian regional-
ism and the multilateral trading system.
This article argues that despite the diverse trade interests among its
21 members, APEC’s soft-law approach has contributed to trans-Pacific eco-
nomic governance and fortified the political foundation to tackle emerging
fragmentation of Asian regionalism. It further contends that APEC’s struc-
tural reform is essential to ensure its complementarity with the WTO and
realizing the Bogor Goals. Such reform requires APEC to constitute an
active incubator for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which
could be an effective ‘Plan B’ for the Doha Round impasse and thus retains
APEC’s advantages over competing regional frameworks.10
Section II examines the impact of APEC’s key stake-holding countries on
APEC’s evolution as a soft institution. The political compromise due to the
East–West divide is reflected in APEC’s structure and development, as well
as its influence on economic integration in the Pacific Rim. Section III
explores APEC’s soft-law mechanism by identifying its WTO-plus achieve-
ments and institutional restrictions. APEC’s role in the realization of the
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and potential pathways to an
FTAAP such as the US-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement
will be addressed. Section IV provides insight into APEC’s prospective actions
to actively implement the Bogor Goals and a binding FTAAP and to buttress
public–private partnership between governments and businesses. APEC’s
reform entails enhancing the soft-law system and introducing hard-law elem-
ents into the decision-making process. To this end, the section discusses
reform proposals for enacting the APEC Charter and strengthening the
8 For the ‘APEC adrift’ argument, refer to John Ravenhill, ‘APEC Adrift: Implications for
Economic Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific’, 13(2) The Pacific Review 319 (2000)
321–27; Hu, above n 1, at 14–16.
9 Legal literature on APEC was mostly published in the 1990s. Examples include David K.
Linnan, ‘APEC Quo Vadis’, 89 American Journal of International Law 824 (1995), Merit
Janow, ‘Assessing APEC’s Role in Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region’, 17
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 947 (1997), and Castan, above n 5.
10 See e.g. C. Fred Bergsten, ‘A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific in the Wake of the Faltering
Doha Round: Trade Policy Alternatives for APEC’, in Charles E. Morrison and Eduardo
Pedrosa (eds) An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2007) 15, 23 (arguing that a
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) will ‘offer a fall-back ‘‘Plan B’’ if Doha were
to fail’.).
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APEC Secretariat and the peer review process. Section V concludes by
summarizing legal and policy recommendations for APEC governments and
trade negotiators.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF APEC AS A SOFT INSTITUTION
Amid the negotiations deadlock in the Uruguay Round and the rapid devel-
opment of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), ministers from Asia-Pacific governments convened in
1989 on Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s initiative.11 APEC was
envisioned as an Asia-Pacific version of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which promotes economic cooper-
ation through dialogue and peer pressure.12 However, the diverse economic
scales of APEC’s 21 members, as evidenced by GDP per capita of Australia
being almost 40 times of that of Papua New Guinea, have posed hurdles to
effective integration.13 The lack of leadership and the East–West divide have
also made APEC shift the focus between trade liberalization and technical
assistance. The political compromise resulted in APEC’s adoption of the
non-binding, consensus-based approach at its inception. Such a compromise
reflects certain APEC members’ reluctance to establish APEC as an inter-
national organization in a legal sense. In particular, developing country
members have been concerned about the transformation of APEC into
a West-dominated FTA, thus compelling them to commit to a degree of
liberalization that will harm their vulnerable domestic industries. Without
an establishment treaty that confers APEC legal personality, APEC can be
best categorized as a soft institution.14
APEC, as an institution that represents its 21 members, has profoundly
influenced FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite certain advantages,
APEC’s soft-law nature could not meet the challenges posed by eco-
nomic downturn caused by the financial crisis and the proliferation of
FTAs due to the Doha Round impasse. APEC members have therefore
gradually agreed on the ‘hardening’ of the institution. These steps, albeit
in an ideal direction, should be accelerated. Reform proposals in this article
will propel APEC to be an overarching framework for trans-Pacific
governance.
11 Andrew Elek, ‘Back to Canberra: Founding APEC’, in The Evolution of PECC: The First 25
Years (Singapore: PECC International Secretariat, 2005) 66, 66–75.
12 Ibid at 71; David MacDuff and Yuen Pau Woo, ‘APEC as a Pacific OECD Revisited’, in
Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC as an Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003) 47, 47–48.
13 The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Australia and Papua New Guinea are USD
55,150 and USD 1,382.3 respectively. APEC Outcomes & Outlook 2011/2012 (2012), at 23.
14 Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Introduction’, in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC as an Institution:
Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2003) xiii, xiv.
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A. Stake-holding countries’ positions on APEC
APEC has developed de facto norms and procedures on the basis of estab-
lished two-decade practices. These soft rules, detailed in the next section,
strengthen APEC’s structure and development and enable APEC to function
as if it were a full-fledged organization. Moreover, APEC’s ‘membership
effect’ has a profound impact on members’ exports and imports.15 The
non-binding integration between APEC members leads to a more than
67% share of intra-regional trade, which is even higher than legally binding
trade blocks, including the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN.16
APEC possesses unique features that make it economically and geopolit-
ically significant. First, APEC provides a trans-regional dialogue platform for
East and Southeast Asia, North and South America, and the Pacific.
Bilateral talks, which take place during APEC summits, elevate APEC’s
pragmatic functionalism. Such talks have covered issues ranging from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia to terrorist attacks.17 In other words, while APEC
has been criticized for its talk-shop nature, its high-profile dialogue has
strengthened APEC’s relevance in global governance. Second, APEC’s
tasks include trade and non-traditional trade mandates. The former includes
WTO-plus and behind-the-border topics, whereas the latter incorporates
issues such as counter-terrorism and anti-corruption.18 Finally, APEC is
not merely an inter-governmental structure. It provides private businesses
a platform to voice their concerns through the APEC Business Advisory
Council (ABAC), thus enhancing public–private partnership in economic
integration.19 For these reasons, APEC’s 21 members have viewed APEC
as a critical forum that advances their trade and political priorities, particu-
larly the free trade agreement (FTA) expansion. In particular, the USA,
China, Russia, and ASEAN have played a significant role in shaping
15 Hyun-Hoon Lee and Jung Hur, Trade Creation in the APEC Region: Measurement of the
Magnitude of and Changes in Intra-regional Trade since APEC’s Inception, APEC Policy
Support Unit (2009), at 30–31.
16 See ibid at 28 (‘We have strong evidence that APEC economies as a whole are enjoying a very
high degree of de facto integration.’). The shares of intra-regional trade in APEC, the
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were respectively 67%, 65%, 41.1%, and
25% in 2007. Progressing towards the APEC Bogor Goals: Perspectives of the APEC Policy
Support Unit (2010), at 15.
17 Terence Hunt, ‘Clinton, Jiang Try to Forge U.S.-China Thaw at APEC Forum’, Amarillo
Global News, 11 September 1999, http://amarillo.com/stories/1999/09/11/usn_LA0677.001.
shtml (visited 1 July 2012); Hanns W. Maull and Nuria Okfen, ‘Comparing Regionalism:
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)’, in
Heiner Hanggi et al. (eds), Interregionalism and International Relations (London and New York:
Routledge, 2006) 217, 225.
18 Topics of APEC, see http://www.apec.org/ (visited 20 June 2012).
19 The APEC Business Advisory Council: Founding and Structure, http://www.abaconline.
org/v4/content.php?ContentID=2521 (visited 20 June 2012).
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APEC’s development. Their trade agendas have invariably influenced
APEC’s overall evolution.
1. The USA
The USA is the world’s largest economy and the key driving force behind
APEC’s trade liberalization initiatives. President Bill Clinton initiated the
prominent APEC summit, officially known as the leaders’ meeting, which
first took place in Blake Island near Seattle in 1993.20 This summit was the
birthplace of APEC’s longstanding custom that all 21 leaders take a group
photo wearing the traditional costume of the host country.21 More funda-
mentally, the US goal was to transform APEC into an ‘Asia-Pacific
Community’ akin to NAFTA, thus compelling their European counterparts
to make further concessions during Uruguay Round negotiations.22 The US
position on the legalization of APEC nonetheless suffered fierce opposition
from Asian counterparts, which preferred to keep APEC as a voluntary and
informal institution.
Although Washington’s enthusiasm for APEC rapidly waned following the
EVSL failure in the late 1990s, APEC was soon revitalized as a vital US
geo-strategic platform.23 On the security front, President George W. Bush
utilized the APEC summit to garner wider support for the fight against
terrorism in response to the 11 September terrorist attacks. The 2001
Leaders’ Declaration thus flagged the first introduction of counter-terrorism
actions into trade-oriented APEC.24 Subsequently, the US Congress also
passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 to urge
20 White House Press Release – New Details: President Obama, First Lady to Travel to Hawai’i,
Attend APEC, 8 November 2011, http://fpc.state.gov/176824.htm (visited 1 July 2012) (‘In
1993, President Clinton invited fellow APEC Leaders to meet on Blake Island near Seattle,
elevating APEC from ministerial to head-of-government level for the first time.’).
21 Due to the financial crisis, the only exception to this photo custom was the 2011 APEC
summit hosted by the United States. ‘Obama Opts Out of APEC Tradition’, CBS News,
14 November 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57324228/obama-opts-out-of-
apec-tradition/(visited 1 July 2012).
22 Yong Deng, ‘Headless Dragons: The Problem of Leadership in APEC’, 22 Fletcher Forum
World Affairs 65 (1998) 68; Sung-Hoon Park and Jeong Yoen Lee, ‘APEC at Crossroads:
Challenges and Opportunities’, 33(2) Asian Perspectives 97 (2009) 108. As China opposed
the use of the word ‘Community’ because it referred to ‘organization’, the compromise was to
use the lower-case ‘C’ so that the word ‘community’ could be translated as ‘family’. Martine
de Koning, ‘APEC: Seven Years of Progress in Trade Liberalisation in the Asia Pacific?’, 25
Australian Law Review 258 (1997) 260–61; William Bodde Jr., View From the 19th Floor:
Reflections of the First APEC Executive Director 38 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1994).
23 See also John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism 97 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001) (explaining that US enthusiasm for APEC decreased
because the APEC Non-Binding Investment Principle revealed the limitation of APEC’s
‘lowest common denominator approach’).
24 Statement on Counter-Terrorism, 21 October 2011; see also 2001 Leaders’ Declaration:
Shanghai Declaration – Meeting New Challenges in the New Century (‘We wish to send a
clear and strong message on the collective resolve of the Asia-Pacific community to counter
terrorism.’).
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the president to focus on APEC to ‘address the emergence of China’ and
‘revitalize United States engagement in East Asia’.25 After coming into office
in 2009, President Barack Obama has similarly emphasized APEC’s role in
fortifying the US–ASEAN security alliance.26 From the trade perspective,
APEC is crucial to implement Obama’s policy to re-engage with Asia
and enhance US leadership in Asian regionalism. The 2011 APEC meeting
in Honolulu demonstrated US commitment to build a ‘seamless regional
economy’.27 Building on the existing FTAs with seven APEC members,
the US trade priority is to finalize the TPP and to make it the most promis-
ing pathway to an APEC-wide FTAAP.28
2. China
The People’s Republic of China has evolved as an emerging global power
since its open-door policy that commenced in 1978. China’s accession to
APEC in 1991 was a major milestone toward integrating into the global
economic order.29 Diplomatically, APEC membership enabled China to
break the blockade following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. APEC
high-level talks have also buttressed China’s stance on par with the USA and
Russia. As ‘three Chinas’ (i.e. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) were sim-
ultaneously admitted into APEC, Beijing was gravely concerned about
Taipei’s official status. Importantly, APEC members are officially called
‘member economies’ rather than states, and heads of states are addressed
as ‘leaders’. This arrangement therefore allows ‘three Chinas’ to co-exist in
APEC. According to the memoranda of understanding (MoUs) that Beijing
and Taipei respectively signed with South Korea, which served as the
APEC chair, Taiwan joined APEC as ‘Chinese Taipei’.30 Contrary to
25 For relevant provisions, see Michael F. Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy in Asia, CRS Report for Congress, 4 February 2010,
at 19. Other statutes that stress US participation in APEC include the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004. Ibid at 18.
26 Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘The Roadmap for a Prospective US-ASEAN FTA: Legal and Geopolitical
Considerations’, 46(2) Journal of World Trade 367 (2012) 371–73.
27 APEC Outcomes & Outlook 2011/2012 (2012), at 20.
28 The United States’ concluded free trade agreements (FTA) with seven APEC members,
including Australia, Canada, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. Free Trade
Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (visited 2 July
2012).
29 Park and Lee, above n 22, at 113.
30 The text of 1991 memoranda of understanding is cited in Philip Y. M. Yang, Taiwan’s
Approaches to APEC: Economic Cooperation, Political Significance, and International
Participation, 14 November 1997, http://club.ntu.edu.tw/yang/apec-paper-2.htm (visited 1
July 2012). The official title of Taiwan is the Republic of China (ROC). The ROC was
founded in Mainland China in 1912 and its government, led by the Chinese Nationalist
Party, fled to Taiwan in 1949.
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China’s contention, such MoUs are not official APEC documents and do
not constitute a legally binding accession package.31 Nonetheless, the ‘prac-
tices’ and ‘conditions’ outlined in MoUs have hindered Taiwan’s APEC
participation.32 Taiwan’s foreign ministers have been excluded from APEC
meetings.33 Although in practice APEC host countries do ‘invite’ the Taiwan
president to attend the summit, the president has to send a representative on
his behalf.34 Presumably, also for political sensitivity, Taiwan has never
hosted the APEC summit.
APEC complements China’s economic reform and FTA efforts. China’s
APEC membership facilitates the government’s attraction of foreign invest-
ment and businesses to collect information on export opportunities. APEC
also served as an external catalyst for liberalization particularly prior to
China’s WTO accession in 2002. In terms of tariff reduction, China com-
plied with the ‘down payment’ it committed to during the Osaka Leaders’
Meeting by lowering its average tariff rate from 35.9% to 23%, covering
more than 4900 items in 1996.35 The ‘domino effect’ has propelled China
to expedite its FTA progress.36 Since the conclusion of the first FTAs with
Hong Kong and Macau in 2003, China has completed nine full-fledged
FTAs with 12 APEC members.37 Significantly, APEC provides a unique
31 See Shih Hsiu-chuan and Chang Yun-ping, ‘Seoul Urged to Honor APEC Agreement’, Taipei
Times, 15 October 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/10/15/
2003275846 (visited 22 June 2012) (‘The Presidential Office [of Taiwan] accused Beijing
of distorting the spirit of [the 1991] MOU . . . .’).
32 Guidebook on APEC Procedures and Practices 20 (2007).
33 Ibid. For example, Taiwan and Hong Kong were excluded from APEC discussions on ter-
rorism because China viewed them as a ‘non-sovereign economies’. Chien-peng Chung,
‘Designing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’, in Lok Sang Ho and John Wong (eds),
APEC and the Rise of China (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011) 15, 31.
34 Guidebook on APEC Procedures and Practices 20 (2007); Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘US
Ambassador Delivers APEC Invite to President’, Taipei Times, 6 July 2011, http://www.taipe
itimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/07/06/2003507538 (visited 1 July 2012). For instance,
Lien Chan, former vice president of the Republic of China (Taiwan), was appointed as the
‘Leader’s Representative’ by President Ma Ying-jiou from 2008 to 2012.
35 The Osaka Initial Actions, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/initial.html
(visited 28 June 2012) [The Osaka Initial Actions]; Daisuke Takoh, ‘China’s APEC Policy
and the Accession to the WTO’, IDE APEC Study Center Working Paper Series 96/97, No. 6
(1997), at 7. See also Vinod K. Aggarwal and Charles E. Morrison, ‘APEC as an
International Institution’, in Ippei Yamazawa (ed.), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC): Challenges and Tasks for the Twenty-first Century (London and New York:
Routledge, 2000) 298, 316 (‘[T]he national bureaucracies often look to APEC and each
other for reinforcement of a liberal economic policy line against domestic interests that do not
share the liberalising ideology.’).
36 For China’s FTA strategy, see Pasha L. Hsieh, The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical
Dimensions and WTO Law, 13(1) Journal of International Economic Law 121 (2011)
131–33.
37 For the information on China’s FTA, see China’s FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
topic/ensingapore.shtml (visited 1 July 2012). Note that the China–ASEAN FTA covers 10
ASEAN states, including seven APEC members.
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opportunity for China to expand ties with Latin America, thus cultivating
FTAs with Chile and Peru. APEC also offers a forum for China–Taiwan
dialogue at the working level despite long-lasting political disagreement. As
an ‘interim agreement’, the landmark Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) that China and Taiwan concluded in 2010
marked Beijing’s most recent FTA progress.38 Post-ECFA developments
may in turn change China’s recalcitrant position on Taiwan’s accession to
FTAs, including an FTAAP. With respect to APEC’s overall mandates,
China has preferred economic cooperation to economic integration.39 This
position reflects Chinese opposition to APEC’s evolution as a negotiation
forum that yields binding commitments. Moreover, China has been cautious
about the TPP due to the concern that APEC will become a US-dominated
network, thus diminishing China’s regional interests.
3. Russia
The Russian Federation is expected to be a key driving force in elevating
APEC’s relevance in the multilateral trading system. The year 2012 marked
a milestone for Russia’s global economic power because it not only acceded
to the WTO, but also served as the chair of the APEC meetings.40 In the
1990s, Russia represented a mere 0.4% of Asia-Pacific exports and was
hardly considered an intrinsic part of Asia from a trade perspective.41
Because of its insignificant trade connection with Asia, Moscow’s admission
to APEC in 1997 was controversial and was criticized as ‘an act of interna-
tional vandalism’.42 A political compromise was reached because Russia’s
APEC membership would alleviate its tensions with Japan over the Kuril
Islands dispute and with the USA over NATO’s eastward expansion, as
well as help China strengthen its non-West alliance in APEC.43 Except for
38 A detailed analysis on the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA), see Hsieh, above n 36, at 121–37.
39 For example, Chinese President Calls on APEC to Reform itself to Raise Efficiency of Co-op,
Xinhua, 15 November 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/15/content_
12460803.htm (visited 1 July 2012).
40 Russia to Become WTO’s 156th Member on Aug 22, Reuters, 23 July 2012, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/07/23/us-russia-wto-idUSBRE86M0MY20120723 (visited 26 July 2012);
For information on Russia and APEC, see http://www.apec2012.ru/docs/about/apec2012.
html (visited 20 June 2012).
41 Artyom Lukin, ‘Russia and the Emerging Institutional Order in the Asia-Pacific’, in Vinod K.
Aggarwal and Richard Feinberg (eds), APEC Study Centers Consortium Conference 2011: Key
Findings and Policy Recommendations: Green Growth, Trade Integration and Regulation
Convergence (APEC Study Centers Consortium, 2011) 101, 108.
42 Speech by The Hon. P J Keeting to 1998 Pacific Rim Forum, 22 September 1998, APEC’s
Six Leaders’ Summit Meeting: Implication for the Strategic Architecture of the Asian
Hemisphere, Australian APEC Study Centre Issues Paper 14, http://www.apec.org.au/docs/
iss14.htm (visited 1 July 2012).
43 Ravenhill, above n 23, at 207.
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terrorism issues, Russia’s participation in APEC has been symbolic, and it
has no clear stance on APEC’s trade agenda.44
The 2012 APEC priorities would fortify Russia’s ‘Strategy 2020’ economic
roadmap endorsed by President Vladimir Putin.45 APEC’s supply chain ini-
tiatives benefit capacity building in facilitating trans-Siberian trade networks
and developing Russia’s Far East region. The Kremlin budgeted USD
22 billion in constructing infrastructure in Vladivostok and its adjacent
Russky Island, a major venue for APEC talks and the leaders’ meeting.46
Furthermore, APEC contributes to Russia’s regional economic integration.
Although Russia’s current FTA partners are confined to members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, it has initiated FTA negotiations or
feasibility studies with three APEC members, including New Zealand,
Vietnam, and Singapore, since 2010. It is expected that APEC membership
will reinforce Russia’s policy of integration into Asian regionalism.47
4. ASEAN
As a fast-growing trade bloc, the 10-state Association of Southeast Asian
Nations has collectively influenced APEC’s trade agendas significantly. For
decades following its founding in 1967, ASEAN progressed marginally under
its non-intervention principle.48 Its slow economic integration did not begin
until 1992, when member states decided to create the ASEAN Free Trade
Area through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme.49
As APEC includes seven ASEAN states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippine, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), it was perceived as both an
opportunity for expanding ASEAN’s eminence and a threat to ASEAN’s
integration.50 In 1990, the Kuching Consensus stipulated ASEAN’s prin-
ciples for its participation in APEC, including preservation of ASEAN’s
‘identity and cohesion’ and opposition to APEC’s ‘adoption of mandatory
directives’.51 Consequently, similar to China’s position, ASEAN states,
44 See Kirill Muradov, ‘Russia and APEC 2012: ‘‘Imaginary Engagement’’ ’, Asia Pacific Bulletin,
No. 141, 6 December 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb141.
pdf (visited 1 July 2012) (‘The only forum with substantial Russian input . . . is the [APEC]
Counter Terrorism Task Force . . . .’).
45 For the ‘Strategy 2020’ plan, refer to the speech by Ambassador Leonid Moiseev’s to the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Conference, 26 April 2012: Nurturing Asia Pacific
Growth in the Aftermath of the Fiscal Crisis in Europe: Paradigm Shift and Structural
Change Needed, or the Russian Approach Perhaps?, at 3–5 (on file with the author).
46 Muradov, above n 44.
47 Lukin, above n 41, at 110. The WTO list of notified RTAs in force includes six Russia’s
FTAs. Russian Federation, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?
MemberCode=643&lang=1&redirect=1 (visited 28 June 2012).
48 ASEAN’s founding document is the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), concluded
on 8 August 1967.
49 For reasons for the slow progress of ASEAN’s initial economic integration, see Hsieh, above
n 26, at 379.
50 For detailed information, see Annex 1.
51 Kuching Consensus (1990), principles (a) and (d).
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except for Singapore, have opposed APEC as a negotiation forum for a trade
bloc and preferred that APEC focus on technical assistance instead of trade
liberalization.
To strengthen its competitiveness compared to the development of
NAFTA and the EU, ASEAN expedited its internal and external economic
integration. In 2007, ASEAN leaders set 2015 as the deadline for forming
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and signed the Charter of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter) to confer the bloc
legal personality.52 Every pre-ASEAN Charter FTA was in fact a combin-
ation of 10 separate FTAs with each member state. ASEAN’s newly gained
legal personality allows the block to negotiate and sign external FTAs as a
single entity.
ASEAN has exercised the policy of power balance, particularly given
China’s emerging economic dominance and the importance of the US
security alliance in South China Sea disputes. Its economic relations reflect
such a policy. ASEAN has concluded FTAs with India and four APEC
members, including Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, thus
making the bloc the center for Asia’s hub-and-spoke architecture.53 In
ASEAN’s view, the ‘ASEAN plus N’ framework, built on former
Malaysian Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s East Asia Economic Caucus
(EAEC) proposal, was a preferred pathway to an FTAAP.54 This framework
has nonetheless limited progress. Four ASEAN states—Brunei, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam—have joined TPP negotiations.55 The TPP may
pose renewed challenges to ASEAN cohesion. One concern is the TPP’s
contravention of the ‘special and different treatment’ mandate outlined in
the 2011 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership.56
B. APEC’s structure and development
APEC’s key stake-holding countries such as the USA, China, Russia,
and ASEAN countries have substantially influenced APEC’s institutional
building and operation. The East–West divide has limited APEC to the
least-common-denominator approach to trade liberalization under soft-law
52 ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard (2010), at 3; Charter of Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (2007) Article 3.
53 The list of ASEAN FTAs, refer to AFTA and FTAs, http://www.aseansec.org/4920.htm
(visited 20 June 2012).
54 See Yong Deng, above n 22, 73 (1998) (‘In July 1993, ASEAN foreign ministers formally
endorsed the EAEC proposal, which would . . . exclude the non-ASEAN countries . . . .’).
55 Members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, see The United States in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/novem-
ber/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (visited 1 July 2012).
56 See ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2011) (‘The
agreement shall provide for special and differential treatment to ASEAN Member States,
especially Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam.’).
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obligations. As a soft institution, APEC’s declarations and decisions consti-
tute political commitments rather than binding treaties. However, de facto
rules established in the past two decades have dominated APEC’s govern-
ance. APEC’s structure includes policy and working levels.57 At the apex of
the policy level is the annual leaders’ meeting, which issues declarations on
APEC’s commitments and agenda. Below the apex are foreign and trade
ministers’ meetings, as well as sectoral meetings that cover finance, trans-
portation, and other APEC-related matters. These ministerial meetings and
the ABAC, which consists of business leaders appointed by APEC govern-
ments, make recommendations to APEC leaders.58 The senior officials’
meeting (SOM), which convenes four times a year, oversees working-level
committees and task groups that include government representatives.59
Divergence of national interests led to APEC’s three-stage development.
In APEC’s infancy, the ambitious 1994 Bogor Declaration that outlined the
2010/2020 target for regional liberalization ignited the high expectation of
this new trans-regional framework. The Declaration underpinned the
three-pillar foundation of APEC’s work agenda, including trade and invest-
ment liberalization, business facilitation (collectively known as TILF), and
economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH).60 To implement the
Bogor Goals, the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) prescribed the guiding
principles that led to the modality of ‘concerted unilateral liberalization’
(CUL).61 Unlike WTO agreements, CUL relies on voluntarism, under
which governments are allowed to liberalize economic sectors at a pace
they choose. Based on CUL, the 1996 Manila Action Plan developed two
mechanisms: the Individual Action Plan (IAP) and the Collective Action
Plan (CAP).62 The IAP requires APEC members to periodically report on
15 policy areas that the OAA identified.63 With collective purposes, the CAP
provides participating countries with best practices and databases, hence
benefiting capacity building.64 Both mechanisms aim at enhancing transpar-
ency and strengthening peer pressure. The infancy stage reached its climax
57 APEC Outcomes & Outlook 2011/2012 (2012), at 25.
58 Martin, above n 25, at 10.
59 The list of APEC working groups, see ibid.
60 APEC at a Glance (2012), at 3 and 6.
61 See Ippei Yamazawa, APEC: New Agenda in its Third Decade 56 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2012) (stating that Japan ‘invented the concept of ‘‘concerted uni-
lateral liberalization’’ (CUL) within the Osaka Action Agenda, which disappointed many
Americans . . . .’).
62 Martin, above n 25, at 11; Man-jung Mignonne Chan, ‘APEC’s Eye on the Prize:
Participants, Modality, and Confidence-Building’, in K. Kesavapany and Hank Lim (eds),
APEC at 20: Recall, Reflect, Remake (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009)
41, 45–46.
63 APEC at a Glance (2012), at 7.
64 For instance, the Group on Services developed the APEC Services Trade Access Requirement
Database that is crucial to service providers’ business expansion. It also held workshops that
assisted small and medium-sized enterprises in the APEC region.
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when the USA, Japan, and Canada garnered support from APEC members
to push the ITA to be the WTO’s first sectoral agreement in 1996.65 Not
surprisingly, the ITA success prompted APEC members to attempt more
audacious trade liberalization.
APEC’s second phase, the frustration period, was marked by the plummet
to its nadir in 1997. Developed APEC countries initiated the Early Voluntary
Sectoral Liberalization program that would lower tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers (NTB) for 15 sectors in 1996.66 In these countries’ view, EVSL could
make APEC ‘useful’ by functioning as a catalyst to expedite trade liberaliza-
tion. EVSL switched from the CUL approach to WTO-style negotiations,
but failed within a year primarily owing to Japan’s opposition supported by
Asian countries.67 Notably, EVSL’s multi-sector coverage was more complex
than the ITA and its inclusion of fisheries and forestry products propelled
fierce opposition in Japan. Due to the Asian financial crisis, many countries
that initially committed to EVSL became incapable of further liberalization.
The EVSL failure made APEC suffer an unprecedented credibility crisis
and shifted APEC’s agenda from TILF to ECOTECH, which developing
countries preferred.
APEC recovered from this prevailing pessimism in the third stage, which
led APEC toward reform and regained momentum for regional economic
integration. The 2001 Shanghai Accord adopted new measures to reinvigor-
ate APEC’s development. The pathfinder approach permits a group of ‘21
minus X’ members to shepherd the implementation of initiatives moving
toward the Bogor Goals.68 This approach contributed to the world’s first
multilateral open skies agreement and promoted innovations such as the
use of electronic certificates of origin (e-CO).69 More remarkably, due to
fast-growing Asian regionalism, APEC leaders announced in 2006 that it was
‘timely for APEC to seriously consider’ the ABAC’s FTAAP proposal.70 An
FTAAP will not only be an attractive ‘Plan B’ for the Doha Round impasses,
but also transform APEC to a binding architecture. The US decision to lead
the TPP and refocus on APEC further brought APEC into prominence.
65 Jiro Okamoto, ‘The Development of EVSL Consultations and Setting the Research
Questions’, in Jiro Okamoto (ed.), Trade Liberalization and APEC (London and New York:
Routledge, 2004) 33, 34–36.
66 The list of designated sectors for early voluntary liberalization, see Ippei Yamazawa, ‘APEC’s
Achievements and Tasks’, in Riyana Miranti and Denis Hew (eds), APEC in the 21st Century
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004) 1, 8.
67 Ibid at 7–10.
68 Appendix 1 – Shanghai Accord: APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration, 21 October 2001.
69 Michael C. Mullen, ‘Business Involvement in APEC’, in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC as
an Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2003) 199, 208; APEC Committee on Trade and Investment: Annul Report
to Ministers 2011 (2011) [CTI Report 2011], at 33.
70 2006 Leaders’ Declaration: Ha Noi Declaration – Towards a Dynamic Community for
Sustainable Development and Prosperity, 19 November 2006 [2006 Leaders’ Declaration].
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF APEC’S INCREMENTAL ACHIEVEMENTS
APEC’s development has ebbed and flowed because of an inevitable
East–West compromise that keeps APEC a non-binding institution and
imposes considerable obstacles to trade liberalization. As a result, criticism
persists as to APEC’s function as a ‘talk shop’ or ‘a perfect excuse to chat’.71
APEC’s soft-law approach is by no means perfect. Nonetheless, APEC’s
contributions that cover WTO-plus and ‘Singapore issues’ should not be
ignored.72 It is these incremental achievements that have catalyzed Asia-
Pacific economic integration amid the wide divergence of trade interests.
A. Ill-defined principles and the soft-law approach
APEC’s evolution has suffered from the inception because of its ill-defined
guiding principles. APEC’s Bogor Declaration failed to define the objective
of ‘free and open trade and investment’.73 The 2010/2020 target dates
depend on an economy’s classification as developed or developing, but
each APEC member has the discretion to determine its classification. The
subsequent Osaka Action Agenda, which intended to elaborate on the Bogor
Goals, lacks neither action nor agenda. The principles outlined in the OAA
contradict each other in practice.74 The principle of flexibility can be inter-
preted as allowing APEC members to choose their own liberalization
timeframes and exclude sensitive sectors from liberalization. Such a principle
can hardly be reconciled with the principle of comprehensiveness that under-
takes ‘all impediments to’ the Bogor Goals.75 Furthermore, consensus
never exists on the non-discrimination principle, commonly known as
‘open regionalism’.76 Controversies lie in the free-riding concern about
whether liberalization should be granted to non-APEC countries such as
71 Monique Chu, ‘Critics Pan APEC as Merely ‘‘A Perfect Excuse to Chat’’ ’, Taipei
Times, 11 November 2000, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/11/11/
0000060755 (visited 1 July 2012). Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating considered
APEC as ‘a talk shop of debatable output’. Elizabeth Keenan, ‘Talking Shop’, Time, 31
August 2007, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1657918,00.html (visited 1
July 2012).
72 ‘Singapore issues’, which refer to working plans determined at the 1996 WTO Ministerial
Conference in Singapore, include competition policy, and on transparency in government
procurement and trade facilitation. Understanding the WTO: Cross-Cutting and New
Issues: Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler Procedures, http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm (visited 20 June 2012).
73 Bogor Declaration, above n 6.
74 These principles ‘are applied to the entire APEC liberalization and facilitation process’. APEC
at a Glance (2012), at 7.
75 Ibid.
76 See Vinod K. Aggarwal and Elaine Kwei, ‘Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC):
Transregionalism with a New Cause?’, in Heiner Hanggi et al. (eds), Interregionalism and
International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) 67, 73 (identifying four
schools of open regionalism).
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the EU on a conditional basis.77 Even APEC’s basic operation principle of
consensus lacks agreement. While no member disputes that APEC consensus
is distinguishable from WTO consensus, which results in a process of bind-
ing commitments, disagreement persists as to whether APEC consensus
denotes unanimity.78
Notwithstanding the absence of clear guidance due to the political reality,
APEC has continued to progress as a trans-regional economic architecture.
It was suggested that the soft-law approach functions more efficiently in
international financial law than in trade law.79 International conventions
including the Basel Accords and institutions such as the Financial Stability
Board and G20 underpin the foundation of the international financial frame-
work.80 The following reasons explain how APEC’s soft-law mechanism
enables APEC to provide comparable functions in the trade arena.
First, the nature of political commitments in APEC’s declarations and
decision, as well as the CUL process, minimizes ‘sovereign costs’.81 The
lack of the treaty-ratification process and potential trade retaliation due to
a violation of the pacta sunt servanda rule have prompted APEC governments
to commit beyond WTO requirements.82 Second, APEC’s best practices and
model measures reflect a common understanding of trade and investment
approaches. By interpreting these soft rules as international standards, APEC
governments have utilized them as ‘voluntary’ external pressure to resist
domestic protectionism for structural reform. Third, the expectation that
these soft rules may evolve to hard law further fortifies their legitimacy.
In fact, the WTO’s ratification of the ITA based on APEC’s consensus
and the use of APEC rules as benchmarks in TPP negotiations prove that
soft law may constitute interim steps to create binding commitments.83
77 Ibid.
78 Akiko Yanai, ‘Characteristics of APEC Trade Liberalization: A Comparative Analysis with the
WTO’, in Jiro Okamoto (ed.), Trade Liberalization and APEC (London and New York:
Routledge, 2004) 9, 22–24.
79 Chris Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – and Not Trade’, 13(3)
Journal of International Economic Law 623, 623–24; Julien Chaisse, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds
in the Making – Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory Strategies’, 45(4) Journal
of World Trade 837 (2011) 837–60. For discussion on APEC’s soft-law approach, see also
Davidson, above n 5, at 15–16; Sungjoon Cho, ‘Rethinking APEC: A New Experiment for a
Post-Modern Institutional Arrangement’, in Mitsuo Matushita and Dukgeun Ahn (eds),
WTO and East Asia: New Perspective (London: Cameron May, 2004) 381, 403–4.
80 David Zaring, ‘Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation’ 52(3) Virginia Journal
of International Law 683 (2012) 688–700; Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial
System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
60–114.
81 The notion of ‘sovereign costs’, refer to Brummer, above n 79, at 631–32.
82 See Harmut Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’, 10(3) European Journal of
International Law 500, 509 (stating that soft law is ‘a self-contained regime’ that ‘exclude[s]
the application of rules which follow pacta sunt servanda . . . .’).
83 See Promoting Supply Chain Connectivity – Can APEC Deliver?, Address by Stephen Jacobi
to Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Conference, 10 May 2012, http://www.nzibf.co.
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Finally, the reporting requirement under APEC’s IAP and its peer review pro-
cess serve as soft enforcement through monitoring members’ progress. The
IAP process galvanizes reputational costs and reciprocity that incentivize com-
pliance with APEC norms.84 Such compliance in turn enhances members’
credibility and yields visible results such as attracting foreign investment.
These soft-law factors ensure APEC’s evolution and relevance. Empirical
evidence in the past two decades similarly demonstrates APEC members’
substantive progress, particularly in areas of business mobility, standards and
conformance, and intellectual property rights.85 Before discussing reform
proposals that will fortify APEC’s soft-law mechanism, it is essential to
understand APEC’s incremental achievements that have contributed to
trans-Pacific regional integration.
1. Tariff reduction for information technology and environmental products
The APEC region witnessed a dramatic decline in the most-favored-nation
(MFN) applied tariff from 16.9% in 1989 to 5.8% in 2010.86 Arguably, tariff
reduction cannot be attributed primarily to APEC because each economy
may have cut tariffs in compliance with WTO or FTA requirements.87
However, APEC members’ ‘down payments’ to which they committed
during the 1995 Osaka Leaders’ Meeting evidenced APEC’s contribution
to tariff liberalization.88 The IAP process that includes customs as a core
element also enhances the effectiveness of tariff reduction.
Particularly, APEC’s sectoral tariff reductions for information technology
(IT) and environmental goods are important case studies. As the WTO’s first
sectoral agreement, the 1996 Information Technology Agreement eliminated
tariffs on six covered categories of IT products by 2010.89 Different from
nz/index.asp?Pageid=2145896562 [Jacobi’s speech] (visited 1 July 2012) (‘TPP . . . provides a
means to take the work from a voluntary, non-binding forum like APEC into a rules-bound
framework of a free trade agreement.’).
84 For example, Hadi Soesastro, ‘Revamping APEC’s Concerted Unilateral Liberalization’, in K.
Kesavapany and Hank Lim (eds), APEC at 20: Recall, Reflect, Remake (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009) 67, 72 (stating that an Indonesian official felt ‘embarrassed’
when he realized ‘that Indonesia’s offer was less progressive than’ [other countries] and there-
fore ‘thought that Indonesia should immediately revise its IAP’).
85 Yamazawa, above n 61, at 65.
86 Keynote Speech by Amb. Muhamad Noor to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
(PECC) Singapore Conference 2012, 27 April 2012, http://www.apec.org/Press/Speeches/
2012/0427_PECC.aspx (visited 1 July 2012).
87 C. Fred Bergsten, ‘APEC in 1997: Prospects and Possible Strategies’, in C. Fred Bergsten
(ed.), Whither APEC? The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future (Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1997) 3, 10 (‘There is no hard evidence
to date that any APEC country has taken additional liberalization steps solely due to APEC.’).
88 The Osaka Initial Actions, above n 35.
89 Catherine Mann and Xuepeng Liu, ‘The Information Technology Agreement: Sui Generis or
Model Stepping Stone?’, in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds), Multilateralizing
Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009) 182, 189.
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other multilateral trade agreements negotiated under the auspices of the
WTO, the ITA’s key components—product coverage and formulas for redu-
cing tariffs—were first agreed upon in the 1996 APEC ministerial meeting.90
The ‘APEC caucus’ in the WTO then transformed the consensus to the
actual binding ITA.91 Since 1996, global exports in IT products have
grown 10% annually and amounted to more than USD 1.4 trillion.92 The
number of WTO members that are parties to the ITA also increased from 28
to 74, representing more than 97% of global IT trade.93 The ITA is crucial
to APEC because nine of the world’s top 10 IT product exporters are APEC
members.94 Moreover, as ITA commitments are on an MFN basis, APEC
developing country members yet to accede to the ITA are entitled to
duty-free treatment, thus enhancing their IT export industries.95
APEC’s relevance to the ITA did not diminish. With dramatic techno-
logical advances, the application of the ITA increases uncertainty.
Numerous IT products have developed multiple functions that original
ITA signatories could not envision. The 1996 Harmonized System (HS)
tariff nomenclature, which provided the basis for the ITA coverage, also
underwent three profound changes as of 2012.96 To accommodate rapid
IT changes, countries have argued for more consumer electronic products
such as global positioning satellite (GPS) and MP3 players to be incorpo-
rated into the ITA.97 The uncertainly involving the ITA culminated in
European Communities and its Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products (EC – IT Products).98 Three APEC
members—the USA, Japan, and Taiwan—brought the WTO complaint
against the EU on the ground that it imposed 6–14% tariffs on three types
of multifunctional machines.99 The complainants contended that the flat
90 Ibid.
91 See also Joint Statement, The Nineteenth APEC Ministerial Meeting, 5–6 September 2007
(requiring ‘Geneva WTO representatives to work through the APEC caucus to provide active
support for’ WTO negotiations).
92 Concept Paper for the Expansion of the ITA, Communication from Canada, Japan, Korea,
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Singapore and the
United States, G/IT/W/36, 2 May 2012 [Concept Paper for the Expansion of the ITA], at 1;
15 Years of the Information Technology Agreement: Trade, Innovation and Global
Production Networks (2012) [15 Years of the ITA], at 3.
93 15 Years of the ITA, above n 92, at 3; Lamy Says ITA Success is Inspiration to Doha
Negotiators, 28 March 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl58_e.htm (visited
1 July 2012).
94 15 Years of the ITA, above n 92, at 54.
95 Mann and Liu, above n 89, at 189.
96 Concept Paper for the Expansion of the ITA, above n 92, at 1.
97 Ken Monahan, ‘Expanding the Information Technology Agreement: New Products, New
Countries’, Bloomberg Gov’t Briefing, 10 August 2011, at 7.
98 Panel Report, European Communities and its Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, 16 August
2010 [EC – IT Products].
99 EC – IT Products, paras 7.119, 7.766, and 7.1138.
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panel displays, set-top boxes with communication functions, and multifunc-
tion digital machines were covered by the ITA, thus entitling duty-free
treatment.100
The WTO panel disagreed with the EU that these products’ new functions
justified reclassification.101 As these products fell within the EU concessions,
the tariff imposition violated the ITA and Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b)
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).102 Significantly,
the panel did not give a blank check to eliminate ITA uncertainty. It carefully
cautioned that multifunctional machines should be determined ‘on a
case-by-case basis’ and that they may become dutiable should their ‘principal
function’ transform fundamentally.103 To meet the need of IT product
exporting countries, the ITA requires revamps. The negotiations for expand-
ing the ITA coverage, also known as ITA II, stalled in 1998, but regained
momentum in both APEC and the WTO.104 After the 2011 APEC Leaders’
Declaration called for APEC’s ‘leadership role in launching [ITA II] nego-
tiations’, four APEC members introduced a concept paper that galvanized
informal WTO negotiations on the ITA.105
The tariff-cutting for IT products similarly informed negotiations over
environmental goods and services liberalization. APEC’s EVSL program,
which covered the environmental sector, failed in 1997.106 The mandate of
‘reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff . . . to environmental goods’
under Article 31.3 of the Doha Declaration suffered the same fate as the
Doha Round.107 Despite the slow negotiation process, APEC’s environmen-
tal goods exports increased by 13.5% annually, amounting to more than
USD 443.5 billion.108 APEC reenergized the momentum to liberalize
trade barriers to environmental goods. In 2011, APEC set ‘green growth’
as a priority and committed to slashing the applied tariff on environmental
100 Paola Conconi and Robert Howse, ‘Panel Report on EC-IT Products’, 11(2) World Trade
Review 223 (2012) 223–24.
101 Ibid.
102 For example, EC – IT Products, paras 8.3–8.11.
103 For example, EC – IT Products, paras 7.734, 7.986, and 7.1501; paras 7.1308 and 7.1397;
Tsai-Yu Lin, ‘Systemic Reflection on the EC-IT Product Case: Establishing an
‘‘Understanding’’ on Maintaining the Product Coverage of the Current Information
Technology Agreement in the Face of Technological Change’, 45(2) Journal of World
Trade 401 (2011) 417–19.
104 Information Technology Agreement – Introduction, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm (visited 1 July 2012).
105 2011 Leaders’ Declaration: The Honolulu Declaration – Toward a Seamless Regional
Economy, 12–13 November 2011 [2011 Leaders’ Declaration]; Concept Paper for the
Expansion of the ITA, above n 92, at 1–2.
106 See Yamazawa, above n 7, at 8 (stating that nominating economies include Canada, Japan,
Taiwan, and the United States).
107 Article 31.3, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
108 Carlos Kuriyama, ‘A Snapshot of Current Trade Trends in Potential Environmental Goods
and Services’, APEC Policy Support Unit Policy Brief, No. 3, 30 April 2012, at 2.
136 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 16(1)
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity on M
arch 14, 2013
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
goods to 5% or less by 2015.109 In 2012, APEC members agreed on the list
of 54 environmental goods for liberalization.110 This initiative may in turn
prompt the APEC caucus to push for WTO action. The only visible oppos-
ition was China, which was initially hesitant to commit to the initiative.111
Beijing stressed APEC’s voluntary nature and argued that the ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ principle should be applied to environmental
goods liberalization.112 A more profound reason was presumably China’s
caution over US ‘protectionist’ measures to increase antidumping and coun-
tervailing actions targeted at China-made solar panels and wind turbine
towers.113 Even though there are differences among APEC members, tariff
reductions for IT and environmental products demonstrated APEC’s role in
bringing forth critical masses for global trade liberalization.
2. Trade facilitation and supply chain connectivity
Equally important to tariff and NTB liberalization, trade facilitation has a
considerable impact on supply chain connectivity and transaction cost. It is
particularly important to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which lack
capacity to handle complex logistics. Trade facilitation was one of the
‘Singapore issues’ incorporated into the subsequent Doha Development
Agenda work program, known as the ‘July Package’, but WTO members
have not agreed on substantive matters other than negotiating modalities.114
In comparison with the WTO, APEC plays an exceptional role in trade
facilitation on a multilateral basis. The soft-law approach is particularly
remarkable in trade facilitation because unlike trade liberalization, trade
facilitation commitments involve limited concessions that would incur do-
mestic opposition. To respond to the 2001 APEC leaders’ call to enhance
trade facilitation, APEC developed two Trade Facilitation Action Plans
(TFAPs), including TFAP I (2002–2006) and TFAP II (2007–2010).115
Through collective actions and pathfinder initiatives, each TFAP cut
109 2011 Leaders’ Declaration, above n 105.
110 APEC List of Environmental Goods: Promoting Exports, Creating Jobs, and Advancing
Green Growth and Sustainable Development, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
fact-sheets/2012/september/apec-environmental-goods (visited 1 November 2012);
Annex 2 – Indicative Timeline to Develop an APEC List of Environmental Goods, 2012/
SOM1/020anx2, 18–19 February 2012, at 2–3.
111 See 16(22) Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 6 June 2012, at 2 (‘[In addition to the United
States,] Thirteen other APEC economies have also submitted environmental goods lists of
their own, though Chia has yet to do so . . . .’).
112 Ibid at 1–2.
113 Steve Leone, ‘DOC Imposes Tariffs on Chinese Wind Towers’, Renewable Energy World,
31 May 2012, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/05/doc-imposes-
tariffs-on-chinese-wind-towers (visited 1 July 2012).
114 Annex D: Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation, Decision Adopted by the
General Council, WT/L/579, 2 August 2004; Doha Development Agenda: Doha Work
Programme, 1 August 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_
31july04_e.htm (visited 1 July 2012).
115 APEC’s Second Trade Facilitation Action Plan (2007), at 3–4.
APEC’S Role as a Trans-Regional Economic Architecture 137
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity on M
arch 14, 2013
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
transaction costs by 5% in the region.116 APEC’s Supply Chain Connectivity
Initiative, launched in 2009, set an APEC-wide goal of reducing an add-
itional 10% in costs by 2015.117
Three areas of APEC trade facilitation efforts can illustrate their innovative
and WTO-plus feature. First, in terms of business mobility, APEC created the
three-year valid APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) scheme that permits
pre-cleared business travelers short-term entry to 18 participating econo-
mies.118 Under this scheme, the USA, Russia and Canada are transitional
members.119 The 2011 APEC Business Travel Card Act, which allows the issu-
ance of the ABTC to qualified US nationals, paved the way for the USA to be a
full member.120 The ABTC scheme has contributed to the savings of USD 3.7
million and enables more than 88,400 ABTC holders to cut time spent at
immigration checkpoints by 52.4% through a specially designated APEC
line.121 Hence, it significantly facilitates temporary movement of natural per-
sons under Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Second, APEC’s standards and conformance initiatives benefit regulatory co-
herence by aligning domestic technical regulations with international stand-
ards. For example, electrical and electronic equipment exports total more
than USD 1 trillion in the APEC region.122 Compliance costs are reduced
because 16 APEC members conform to the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) standards, and 18 participate in mutual recognition ar-
rangements of conformity assessment.123 These APEC initiatives complement
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), particularly
given the increasing number of TBT disputes in the WTO.124
116 Ibid.
117 Jacobi’s speech, above n 83.
118 APEC Business Travel Card, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Business-
Resources/APEC-Business-Travel-Card.aspx (visited 2 June 2012) [APEC Business Travel
Card]. The APEC Business Mobility Group is considering extending the validity of the
APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) from three to five years. CTI Report 2011, above n
69, at 12.
119 APEC Business Travel Card, above n 118.
120 Fact Sheet: APEC on Travel Facilitation, 12 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/11/12/fact-sheet-apec-travel-facilitation (visited 1 July 2012); see also
Murray Hiebert, ‘Why U.S. Approval of the APEC Business Travel Card Matters’, Center
for Strategic & Int’l Studies, 14 December 2011, http://csis.org/publication/why-us-approval-
apec-business-travel-card-matters (visited 1 July 2012) (‘The ABTC program will not change
procedures for foreigners entering the United States. U.S. immigration law does not recog-
nize the ABTC as an entry visa . . . .’).
121 APEC’s Achievements in Trade Facilitation in 2007-2010: Final Assessment of the Second
Trade Facilitation Action (TFAP II) (2012) [APEC Trade Facilitation], at 1.
122 Ibid at 10.
123 Ibid.; CTI Report 2011, above n 69, at 33.
124 For example, Panel Report, United States – Measure Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, 2 September 2011; Panel Report, United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R,
15 September 2011); Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin
Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R, 29 June 2012.
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Finally, fragmented customs procedures can frustrate ‘even the most effi-
cient supply chain’.125 Under the APEC working group’s auspices, 13 APEC
members adopted single window systems to harmonize customs procedures
and reduce duplicate paperwork required by multiple agencies.126
An experiment-based paperless e-CO system also showed a potential de-
crease of 6.8% in transaction costs should it be adopted APEC-wide.127
Furthermore, 10 APEC members initiated a pathfinder initiative that com-
mitted to exempting shipments from customs duties if they are under the
de minimis value of USD 100.128 These innovative measures fortified APEC’s
role in facilitating multi-modal transport in the global supply chain.
3. Best practices and model measures on trade and investment
APEC’s best practices and model measures on trade and investment areas
have buttressed APEC’s soft-law mechanism in the past two decades. These
instruments, which cover investment, competition, government procurement,
rules of origin (ROOs) and FTAs, complement the WTO by tackling
‘Singapore issues’ and other behind-the-border matters.129 They not only re-
flect generally accepted regulatory practices, but also serve as guidance for
creating hard-law in the WTO and FTAs. APEC’s non-binding rules were
therefore carefully drafted as if they were binding. A highly relevant example
is the Best Practices for RTAs/FTAs in APEC, which was circulated to the WTO
for reference.130 The best practices, which call for ‘avoiding duplication with
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism’, address the overlapping jurisdiction
issue in Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico –
Soft Drinks).131 In this case, the Appellate Body decided that the WTO cannot
125 APEC’s Second Trade Facilitation Action Plan, 2007/MRT/004, 6 July 2007, at 19.
126 Single Window Report – Working toward the Implementation of SW in the APEC
Economies and International Interoperability, 2010/SOM3/SCCP/002, 15–17 September
2007, at 1.
127 APEC Trade Facilitation, above n 121, at 16–17.
128 See Raising the de minimis Threshold to Enhance Supply-chain Connectivity, 3 January
2012, http://www.apec.org/Press/Features/2012/0103_deminimis.aspx (visited 1 July 2012)
(‘Setting a de minimis threshold of US$100 could amount to cost savings of US$19.8 billion
per year . . . .’).
129 For example, APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles (1994), APEC Principles to
Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform (1999), APEC Non-Binding Principles on
Government Procurement (1999), APEC Transparency Standards on Government
Procurement (2004), Best Practices for FTAs/FTAs in APEC (2004), APEC Model
Measures for Trade Facilitation in RTAs/FTAs (2005), and APEC Model Measures for
RTAs/FTAs (2007), APEC Model Measures on ‘Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures’
Chapter (2007).
130 Best Practices for FTAs/FTAs in APEC (2004); Communication from Chile and the
Republic of Korea, Best Practices for FTAs/FTAs in APEC, TN/RL/W/187, 12 September
2005.
131 Ibid; Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/
DS308/AB/R, 24 March 2006 [Mexico – Soft Drinks].
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decline its jurisdiction due to NAFTA’s exclusion clause.132 It nonetheless
indicated that a ‘legal impediment’ may exclude WTO jurisdiction in other
cases.133 As WTO jurisdiction at best provides limited guidance on the def-
inition of ‘legal impediment’, APEC’s soft-law best practices fill the gap to
prevent complications arising from overlapping jurisdiction.
The legitimacy of APEC’s consensus-based best practices and model
measures incentivize compliance. Investigation into 28 FTAs and bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) in the APEC region show a high degree of con-
formity with the Non-Binding Investment Principles and other investment
instruments.134 The only notable gaps between the Principles and these
FTAs and BITs exist in prior authorization requirements and national treat-
ment at the pre-establishment stage.135 Also, evidence showed that APEC
members have applied the voluntary Transparency Standards on Government
Procurement.136 Indonesia, Vietnam, Peru, and Mexico incorporated such
transparency standards into domestic law as anti-corruption reforms.137
Domestic opposition to the adoption of the standards largely decreased
because they reflect internationally accepted benchmarks. These standards
are crucial to APEC as a whole because only seven APEC members signed
the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and are therefore
obliged to comply with the Article XVII transparency requirement under
the GPA.138 Another example of compliance is the Model Measures on
Rules of Origin, which contributes to ROO harmonization.139 Pursuant to
these measures, ASEAN’s CEPT changed from applying only the 40% re-
gional value content rule to also allowing the tariff-heading change rule.140
The comparison in the ROO requirement of the ASEAN–China FTA and
the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which concluded
132 Mexico – Soft Drinks, paras 42–53.
133 Ibid., para 54.
134 APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles (1994); Identifying Core Elements in Investment
Agreements in the APEC Region, APEC Committee on Trade and Investment: APEC
Investment Experts’ Group, prepared by United Nations Conference for Trade and
Development, December 2007 [Investment Agreements in the APEC Region], at 3.
135 Investment Agreements in the APEC Region, above n 134, at 36–41.
136 APEC Transparency Standards on Government Procurement (2004).
137 APEC Procurement Transparency Standards in Indonesia: A Work in Progress 22–26
(2011); APEC Procurement Transparency Standards in Vietnam: The Need to Move
from Law to Practice 20–24 (2011); APEC Procurement Transparency Standards in Peru:
Strengthening the Culture of Integrity 24–28 (2011); APEC Procurement Transparency
Standards in Mexico: Time to Engage the Private Sector 17–23 (2011).
138 These APEC members include Canada, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan, and the United States. Parties and Observers to the GPA, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (visited 20 July 2012).
139 APEC Model Measures on ‘Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures’ Chapter (2007).
140 Yamazawa, above n 61, at 76; Effective from 1 August 2008, all ASEAN member states have
agreed to implement the new Rules of Origin (ROO) for Common Effective Preferential
Treatment (CEPT), http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_
91bc0171-c0a81573-21d621d6-95e3178e (visited 20 July 2012).
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after the model measures, also reflects the same change to allow further
flexibility.141
B. Pathways to a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific
As demonstrated above, the significance of APEC’s role as a trans-regional
economic architecture could refute the conventional ‘talk-shop’ criticism.
However, it cannot be denied that APEC’s soft-law mechanism is circum-
scribed. In terms of tariff reduction, APEC’s approach is limited to the sec-
toral approach, which focused on ‘easy’ sectors at the core of almost all
APEC members’ export interests. The liberalization of sensitive sectors
that led to the previous EVSL failure remains a challenge. Although most
APEC members’ MFN applied rate is below 10%, dairy products exported
to the USA and beverages and tobacco exported to Vietnam and Malaysia
are subject to tariff rates of 20.3%, 43.6%, and 120.9% respectively.142 To
persuade APEC economies to provide concessions on these sectors on a
multilateral basis requires a binding FTA’s give-and-take approach.
Most of APEC’s trade facilitation initiatives are implemented through the
pathfinder ‘21 minus X’ approach. In fact, fewer than 12 APEC members
take part in six out of 12 pathfinder initiatives.143 The e-CO project, albeit
innovative, has only three participating economies.144 The participation in
trade facilitation initiatives largely depends on national reform agendas. The
fact that only a few initiatives are conducted ‘on the basis of reciprocity’
further decreases the incentive to participate.145 Moreover, APEC’s best
practices and model measures serve as guidance for members. The problem
nonetheless lies in compliance, which substantially varies across issue areas.
For instance, while ROO harmonization may be encouraged by the Model
Measures on Rules of Origin, it is inconceivable to rely on such measures to
solve the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem.146 This issue has particularly escalated to
a far-reaching challenge as a result of divergent ROOs in 21 APEC members’
128 FTAs including 49 intra-APEC FTAs.147
141 ASEAN FTA Agreements, http://www.aseansec.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/AEC-12.pdf (visited
22 July 2012).
142 Key Indicators Database, StatsAPEC, http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/key_indicator/kid_
result/4 (visited July 20, 2012); Brock Williams, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries:
Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis’, CRS Report for Congress, 30 May 2012, at
27–28.
143 CTI Report 2011, above n 69, at 33.
144 Ibid.
145 APEC Pathfinder Initiative for Self-certification of Origin, http://www.apec.org/Home/
Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment//media/
47422D81998D46DFBFE79D5A3D8DB56A.ashx (visited 20 July 2012).
146 The ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem, which refers to the complication that arises from the appli-
cation of rules of origins in multiple FTAs, is also known as the ‘noodle bowl’ problem in the
context of Asian regionalism.
147 Amb. Muhamad Noor, Regional Economic Integration: The Role of APEC, Power Point
Slides (2012), at 4 (on file with the author); see also APEC and Progress toward Bogor
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To solve fragmentation of FTAs and APEC’s soft-law restriction, it is vital
for APEC to undertake a more active role in cultivating an APEC-wide
FTAAP. Built on existing achievements supported by political consensus,
APEC’s position as an overarching architecture should complement regional
trading blocs by harmonizing their differences. Therefore, APEC govern-
ments are reminded that the proliferation of FTAs without an enhancement
of APEC’s role would counteract economic integration. An FTAAP was
first proposed by the ABAC in 2004.148 An FTAAP is deemed a promising
‘Plan B’ for the Doha Round impasse and a stimulus for the Bogor Goals.
It is expected to revitalize trade liberalization by transforming APEC into a
binding trade bloc. After APEC decided to ‘seriously consider’ the ABAC
proposal in 2006, the 2010 Leaders’ Declaration identified potential path-
ways to an FTAAP, including ‘ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership’.149 ASEAN+3 encompasses ASEAN’s 10 countries and China,
Japan and Korea, and ASEAN+6 covers these members, as well as Australia,
India and New Zealand.150 The TPP is an expansion of the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (the P4 Agreement), which was
concluded between Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei and became
effective in 2006.151 The USA joined the TPP in 2009 and aimed at building
the TPP as the ‘high-standards, 21st-century agreement’ that will fortify
the US policy to re-engage with Asia.152 As of November 2012, the
TPP has undergone 14 rounds of negotiations and expanded to 11 APEC
economies.153
Of the three pathways to an FTAAP, the TPP has progressed most sub-
stantially. The TPP has encountered fewer political hurdles than its
Goals, Inter-American Development Bank (2010), at 1 (‘Nearly two-thirds of APEC mem-
bers’ total trade is with other APEC economies. 42 percent of the intra-APEC trade, in turn,
is between parties to an FTA . . . .’).
148 Mary Swire et al., APEC Business Leaders Push Asia-Pac FTA, Tax-News, 29 February
2012, http://www.tax-news.com/news/APEC_Business_Leaders_Push_AsiaPac_FTA—54212
.html.
149 2006 Leaders’ Declaration, above n 70; 2010 Leaders’ Declaration: Yokohama Declaration –
The Yokohama Vision – Bogor and Beyond, 13–14 November 2010 [2010 Leaders’
Declaration].
150 Ian F. Fergusson and Bruce Vaughn, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’, CRS Report
for Congress, 10 January 2011, at 7.
151 Ibid. at 1.
152 Ibid.; USTR Statement Regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, http://www.
ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/september/ustr-statement-regarding-trans-
pacific-partnersh (visited 20 July 2012).
153 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 15th Round of TPP Negotiations Set for Auckland,
New Zealand - 3–12 December 2012, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (visited 26 November
2012); News: TPP Stakeholder Meeting, Australian Government: Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade [News: TPP Stakeholder Meeting], http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/ (visited
20 July 2012); Matt Spetalnick et al., ‘Thailand Says to Join Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Talks’, Reuters, 18 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/us-asia-
obama-trade-idUSBRE8AH06R20121118 (visited 19 November 2012).
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competitors because ‘in theory’, all APEC members are able to join. While
Washington has opposed the ‘ASEAN plus N’ framework to transform an
intra-Asia FTA that excludes the USA, Japan and ASEAN are also con-
cerned about this framework becoming Sino-centric.154 In comparison, the
TPP has included more APEC members. Economic models also demon-
strate that the TPP can create a more positive impact on the 21 members’
GDP and welfare than ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6.155
Notwithstanding the TPP’s rapid development, its substantive influence
on APEC is rarely systemically examined. I offer the following observations.
First, the pre-condition of whether the TPP can be a constructive building
block for an APEC-wide FTAAP lies in the TPP’s membership and asso-
ciated trade effect. In reality, the TPP’s expansion hinges on its significance
to US trade because Washington is the TPP’s major driving force. APEC as
a whole encompasses 62% of US merchandise trade, and the current 11
TPP members cover only 28% of such trade.156 For the USA, the economic
significance of including Canada and Mexico, the latest TPP members, is
limited because NAFTA covers most of their trade.157 Although China is the
world’s second largest economy, its TPP membership can be a complicated
issue because of the US Congress’ critical stance on Beijing’s unfair trade
practices.158 Tokyo expressed interest in joining the TPP in 2011.159 While
Japan would substantially increase the TPP’s economic scale, its accession
hinges on whether its government can overcome the agriculture sector’s
opposition amid a fragile post-quake recovery.
Importantly, the ongoing trilateral China–Japan–Korea (CJK) FTA
negotiations could challenge the TPP’s expansion, as the three countries
may view it as an interim substitute for the TPP. The CJK FTA launched
negotiations in 2012, following the conclusion of the CJK investment
agreement.160 The CJK FTA not only covers trilateral trade valued at
154 See e.g. Yamazawa, above n 61, at 114 (discussing US opposition to Malaysia’s East Asian
Economic Caucus proposal).
155 Sangkyom Kim, Pathways to Asia-Pacific Economic Community: ASEAN +3, +6 or TPP?
Power Point Slides (2011), at 21–25 (on file with the author).
156 Williams, above n 142, at 8.
157 Ibid.
158 See also Tingsong Jiang and Warwick J. Mckibbin, ‘What Does a Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific Mean to China’, Brookings Global Economy & Development Working Paper,
23 August 2008, at 19 (‘China would turn to a loser of US$4billion . . . if without joining
the FTAAP . . ..’).
159 TPP Leaders Announce Broad Outline of Agreement; Japan, Canada and Mexico Express
Interest, 15 November 2011, http://www.barnesrichardson.com/?t=40&an=10194&format=
xml&p=3731 (visited 1 July 2012).
160 ‘China Plans Talks with Japan, Korea on Free Trade Area’, Bloomberg News, 14 May 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-12/china-japan-korea-to-start-free-trade-talks-this-
year.html (visited 1 July 2012).
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USD 690 billion, but also influences the countries’ stance on the TPP.161 In
China’s view, the CJK FTA may counterbalance the US-dominated TPP,
which makes it difficult for China to join due to the demanding accession
terms set by Washington.162 Both Japan and Korea are uneasy with the
TPP’s impact on heavy farm subsidies and may expect to concede much
less in agriculture under the CJK FTA. Korea particularly holds the
wait-and-see view on the TPP because the Korea-US FTA has already sub-
stantially liberalized barriers to the US market.163
Second, the TPP membership is associated with its accession process.
Although Article 20 of the P4 Agreement allows ‘any APEC Economy’ to
enter the agreement, this ‘open accession clause’ is more complex in oper-
ation.164 Candidate countries are expected to negotiate with each TPP
member on a bilateral basis before an informal ‘invitation’ is extended
based on the consensus of the existing members. The new members’ acces-
sion is also subject to congressional approval. In the US case, such approval
requires 90 days.165 What APEC economies should note is that the TPP’s
‘highly secretive law making process’, which academics and the US Congress
have criticized, has undermined the fairness of the accession procedure.166
The TPP’s lack of transparency renders countries that subsequently acceded
second-tier members.167 Even though the negotiating countries were not
informed of textual details, they are unable to veto negotiated provisions
upon accession.168 This process poses daunting obstacles for APEC
161 ‘China, Japan, South Korea Agree to Start Free-Trade Negotiations’, Macau Daily, 24 July
2012, http://devmdt.macaudailytimes.com.mo/index.php/asia-pacific/35790-china-japan-
south-korea-agree-to-start-free-trade-negotiations.html (visited 26 July 2012).
162 See Shiro Amstrong, ‘China’s Participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, East Asia
Forum, 11 December 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/11/china-participation-in-
the-trans-pacific-partnership/ (visited 26 July 2012) (examining the impact of China’s acces-
sion to the TPP).
163 Robert Scollay, ‘Evolution of the Asia-Pacific Trade Architecture: Stocktake and Future
Outlook, in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Richard Feinberg (eds), APEC Study Centers
Consortium Conference 2011: Key Findings and Policy Recommendations: Green Growth, Trade
Integration and Regulation Convergence (APEC Study Centers Consortium, 2011) 145, 154.
164 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Article 20.6.1.
165 Trans-Pacific Partnership, http://www.canadians.org/trade/issues/TPP/index.html (visited
23 July 2012).
166 David S. Levine et al., Letter to Amb. Ron Kirk, 9 May 2012, http://bloglawblog.com/blog/
(visited July 22, 2012); Rosa L. DeLauro et al., Letter to The Honorable Ambassador Ron
Kirk, 27 June 2012, http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Letter%20FINAL.pdf
(visited July 22, 2012).
167 See Michael Geist, ‘What’s behind Canada’s Entry to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks’,
28 June 2012, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6566/159/ (visited 26 July 2012)
(‘The price of admission was very steep - Canada appears to have agreed to conditions
that grant it second-tier status . . . .’).
168 Ibid.
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members to assess their capability to join the TPP. For example, it is still
unclear to what extent the TPP membership will affect Canada’s dairy prod-
ucts, which are highly protected under a 315% tariff.169
Third, with respect to the TPP’s substance, intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection is a key issue. Developed countries, led by the USA, have pursued
the imposition of requirements beyond the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), which included seven APEC-member signatories,
was the major initiative to cultivate TRIPS-plus standards on a multilateral
basis.170 After the European Parliament voted down the ACTA due to
human rights and freedom of expression concerns in 2012, the TPP became
the most feasible venue for TRIPS-plus standards.171 Nonetheless,
TRIPS-plus obligations can be difficult for APEC’s developing countries to
accept. An example is Thailand’s reluctance to US demands of including
TRIPS-plus pharmaceutical patent protection due to the Thai health sector’s
opposition.172 Chile, an original TPP member, even threatened to withdraw
from TPP talks because of unreasonable IPR standards.173 Not to mention that
the TPP standards go beyond ACTA requirements. While both treaties man-
date criminal penalties for willful copyright infringements on a ‘commercial
scale’, the TPP proposal allows even ‘acts that result in no direct or financial
gain’ to be punished.174 Seeking convergence of these IPR issues will continue
to be a challenge for TPP negotiations.
Fourth, compared to APEC’s soft-law approach, the TPP will provide a
more effective mechanism for ROO harmonization that will prevent the ‘spa-
ghetti bowl’ syndrome. The TPP’s controversial ROO issue is the potential
adoption of the ‘yarn-forward’ rules, which were included in the NAFTA
and following US FTAs. Under such rules, textile and apparel products can
169 ‘Pacific Free Traders Eye Canada’s Dairy, Poultry Markets’, The Globe and Mail, 21 June
2012, http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/pacific-free-traders-eye-canadas-dairy-
poultry-markets/article4358953/?service=mobile (visited 1 July 2012).
170 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), http://www.ustr.gov/acta/ (visited 22 July
2012) (stating that signatories include ‘[t]he United States, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan,
New Zealand, Morocco, and Singapore’).
171 ‘ACTA: Controversial Anti-Piracy Agreement Rejected by EU’, BBC News, 4 July 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18704192 (visited 6 July 2012).
172 See generally Duangrat Laohapakakul, United States – Thailand Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations: Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand, April 2006,
LL.M. Paper, Harvard Law School, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/774/
Laohapakakul06.pdf (visited 6 July 2012).
173 Sean Flynn, ‘Chile Threatens to Pull out of TPP Because of US IP Demands’, 10 May
2012, http://infojustice.org/archives/21414 (visited 6 July 2012).
174 Glyn Moody, ‘Some Countries Want to Fix TPP . . . By Making it More Like ACTA’,
22 May 2012, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120515/06141218921/some-countries-
want-to-fix-tpp-making-it-more-like-acta.shtml (visited 6 July 2012).
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only be accorded preferential treatment if they originate from FTA countries
and their cutting and assembling also occur in the region.175 Preferred by the
US textile industry, the yarn-forward rules nonetheless contravene export
interests of Vietnam and Malaysia, both of which substantially use Chinese
fabrics.176 Finally, the TPP’s WTO-plus labor rights and environmental
standards increase accession regulatory costs. Brunei, Mexico and Vietnam
will be required to revamp their labor regulations, as their labor unions are
primarily government or company-controlled and lack independent legal
status.177 These WTO-plus requirements will impose significant obstacles
should China and Russia intend to join the TPP.
The TPP serves as a critical avenue to achieve APEC’s Bogor Goals and an
FTAAP and therefore profoundly impacts the APEC agenda. In 2010, APEC
leaders instructed APEC to be the ‘incubator’ to offer ‘leadership and intellec-
tual input into’ potential development of the TPP, as well as ASEAN+3 and
ASEAN+6.178 However, APEC has thus far failed to enforce this mandate.
APEC’s position as a non-negotiating forum makes it a passive incubator. It
has provided neither leadership nor intellectual input or even logistic support
for ongoing TPP talks. The only ‘mechanism’ that APEC performed is to offer
convenient forums for TPP negotiations on the sidelines of APEC meetings.
The APEC report on the TPP merely explains how the TPP and APEC are
mutually beneficial and how APEC’s existing soft-law rules can be useful.179 In
other words, APEC’s position in reality is ‘what we have done is enough’. APEC
should assess the impact of various regional undertakings on APEC members.
Providing an in-depth legal and economic analysis of TPP proposals will help
non-TPP members assess potential accession. Such an analysis will contribute
to the TPP’s much-needed transparency and facilitate the convergence of
APEC members’ trade interests in negotiations.
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
As APEC is marching toward its third decade, it becomes necessary for the
soft-institution to undergo reforms to respond to ‘next-generation trade and
investment issues’.180 Although academics and APEC members have proposed
reform initiatives through the APEC International Assessment Network and
175 Leonie Barrie, ‘Why US Textile Groups Fear Vietnam in TPP Pact’, 2 June 2011, http://
www.just-style.com/analysis/why-us-textile-groups-fear-vietnam-in-tpp-pact_id111261.aspx
(visited 1 July 2012).
176 Greg Rushford, ‘Obama’s Double Standard on TPP’, The Wall Street J., 7 May 2012, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304363104577389601932234844.html (visited 1
July 2012).
177 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Citizens Trade Campaign, http://www.citizenstrade.
org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/TransPacificFactsheet.pdf (visited 22 July 2012).
178 2010 Leaders’ Declaration, above n 149.
179 The Mutual Usefulness between APEC and TPP, APEC Policy Support Unit, October
2011.
180 2011 Leaders’ Declaration, above n 105.
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the Reform Friends of the Chair since 2000, progress has been sluggish.181
APEC governments should focus APEC reform on transforming its role to
an active incubator for the Bogor Goals that may lead to an FTAAP.
A cost-benefit analysis would support the proposals below as a feasible
reform roadmap. On one hand, the potential costs are limited because the
advantages of APEC’s soft-law approach will be maintained in sensitive
areas. The introduction of hard-law elements poses surmountable challenges
to developing country members, particularly when compared with the com-
peting FTA initiatives in which they already take part. Additional expenses
that may occur for structural reform will constitute only a fraction of the
budgets for APEC’s annual meetings. On the other hand, reforming the
decision-making mechanisms by allowing for legally binding agreements
will pave the way for a binding FTAAP, which will reduce business and
government costs because of the fragmentation of regional FTAs. The pro-
posals that strengthen APEC’s ‘think tank’ and peer review functions, mod-
eled on the OECD and the WTO, will further energize APEC’s role as an
indispensable trans-regional economic framework.
A. The APEC Charter
I propose the ratification of the APEC Charter, which will confer legal per-
sonality on the institution and transform APEC’s sui generis status under
international law.182 Most multilateral organizations are accorded legal
status under their establishment treaties such as the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO.183 In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dealt with a pre-
liminary question as to legal personality of the United Nations (UN).184
Although the Charter of the United Nations does not mention legal person-
ality, the ICJ found that based on the Charter’s ‘purposes and principles’ and
the UN’s ‘practice’, the UN possesses ‘indispensible’ personality on the
international plane separate from member states.185 Unlike these cases,
APEC’s legal personality can be neither conferred nor inferred. The 1992
Bangkok Declaration that stipulated APEC’s intuitional arrangements was
simply a declaration of intent, and members have consistently emphasized
the non-binding nature of APEC’s instruments and operation.
181 John McKay et al., ‘Preface’, in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC as an Institution:
Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2003) 7, 7; APEC Reform 2006 Deliverables, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
November 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/2006/reform.html (visited 1
July 2012).
182 Ravenhill, above n 23, at 4 (discussing APEC’s sui generis status).
183 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article VIII.1.
184 Advisory Opinion, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ
Reports (1949), at 118–79.
185 Ibid.
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APEC should take a meaningful step to elevate its legal status. A common
interest of 21 members, the APEC Charter will buttress APEC’s commitments
to economic integration. ASEAN may serve as a model. Like the Bogor
Declaration, the loose ASEAN Declaration that established ASEAN mandates
no legal obligations.186 It took ASEAN almost 10 years to pass the first formal
accord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.187 While main-
taining the consensus-based principle, ASEAN’s institutionalization culmi-
nated in the ASEAN Charter in 2007. As the evolution demonstrates, the
drive for integration can overcome the Westphalian non-intervention concept.
Similarly, the APEC Charter will be a pivotal impetus for accelerating APEC’s
implementation of the Bogor Goals. As APEC members have agreed upon a
legally binding FTAAP as APEC’s target, the APEC Charter will provide an
incremental contribution to the process.
Under the APEC Charter, flexible consensus should be introduced into the
decision-making process so that trade liberalization and facilitation initiatives
can progress significantly. While recognizing that certain binding resolutions
will expedite the process, ‘special and differential treatment’ should be granted
to less developed countries. Based on the ITA and EVSL experiences, APEC
should prioritize liberalizing less sensitive trade areas. Such liberalization
can nonetheless be conducted on a multi-sectoral basis. Commitments to the
pathfinder approach should not be accorded to non-participating countries,
thus avoiding the free-rider problem and incentivizing additional members
to participate. In addition, the APEC Charter should include the accession
procedure for institutional growth. The 1997 APEC guidelines stipulate criteria
for new members such as geographic location and ‘substantial and broad-based
economic linkages with existing APEC members’.188 Yet, due to the morator-
iums that extended to 2010, candidate countries including India, Panama
and Myanmar were rejected from APEC membership.189 More transparent
accession procedures under the APEC Charter should allow for lifting the
current de facto membership moratorium. Granting membership to Pacific
Rim economies that commit to APEC’s liberalization agenda will further
energize regional integration.
186 ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) (1967).
187 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976).
188 APEC Ministerial Statement on Membership (1997).
189 In 2007, the original 10-year moratorium was further extended to 2010. Eric M. Pedersen,
‘What Future Course of Action Should it Pursue?’, 16 Currents: International Trade Law
Journal 31 (2008) 34; see also Won-Ho Kim, ‘The Next APEC Membership from Latin
America: A Contextual Approach’, KIEP APEC Study Series 08-03 (2008), at 14 (‘The failed
applicants from 1997 and 2007 – India, Colombia, Ecuador, Macao, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Panama, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar - possible will be the next candidates for
new membership.’).
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B. Governance of the APEC Secretariat
The 1992 Bangkok Declaration provided the basis for the APEC Secretariat
to be established in Singapore.190 Unlike APEC’s sui generis status, the
APEC Secretariat was granted ‘the legal capacities of a body corporate’
under Singapore law in 1993.191 As the Bangkok Declaration was not a
legally binding treaty, privileges and immunities of the APEC Secretariat
and its staff are confined to Singapore only.192 The APEC Secretariat is
unable to issue travel documents akin to UN laissez-passers to staff mem-
bers.193 In fact, APEC officials have to use their own national passports
subject to the 21 members’ visa requirements.194 This travel barrier hinders
their work efficiency and renders their status inferior to business profes-
sionals who are ABTC holders. More seriously, unlike international organ-
izations, neither APEC nor its Secretariat is entitled to assert privileges and
immunities in foreign courts. This defect poses legal risks to Secretariat
employees, many of whom undertake tasks in APEC host countries that
lack well-developed legal systems. A case comparable to the distinction be-
tween APEC and its Secretariat is ASEAN. The ASEAN Secretariat was
once only recognized as a legal person under the law of Indonesia, where
the Secretariat sits.195 However, the ASEAN Charter provides a legal basis
for obliging 10 member states to recognize privileges and immunities of
ASEAN and its affiliated personnel. This issue, which is of pragmatic
significance, reinforces my previous argument for the APEC Charter.
Other than strengthening its legal status, the APEC Secretariat should engage
in further reform. In the initial era, members’ reluctance to institutionalize
APEC led to the weakness of the Secretariat. As illustrated in Table 1 below,
the financial support and staff of the APEC Secretariat are far more limited than
their WTO, OECD and ASEAN counterparts. Its annual budget of USD 5
million accounts for less than one-third of the ASEAN Secretariat’s budget.196
190 Bangkok Declaration on Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC): Institutional Arrangement –
1992 APEC Ministerial Meeting, Article A.1.
191 The International Organizations (Immunities and Privileges) (APEC Secretariat) Order
1993, Article A.3.
192 See generally Agreement between the Government of Singapore and the Secretariat of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization Relating to the Privileges and Immunities
of the APEC Secretariat (1993); Supplemental Agreement between the Secretariat of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC) Relating to the Privileges and
Immunities of the APEC Secretariat (2005).
193 Article VII of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
authorizes the issuance of UN laissez-passers.
194 Interview with APEC officials [names withheld], 12 March 2012.
195 Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and ASEAN Relating to the Privileges and
Immunities of the ASEAN Secretariat (1979), Article 2.2.
196 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘ASEAN Secretariat Must Be Empowered’, The Nation, 21 May 2012,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Asean-Secretariat-must-be-empowered-
30182419.html (visited 1 July 2012); APEC – Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mfat.
govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/APEC/5-APEC-FAQs.php (visited 17 June 2012).
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In addition to locally recruited administrative personnel, 19 of 60 staff members
are ‘seconded diplomats’ who primarily serve as program directors.197 This
system reflects some countries’ mentality to have ‘their own people’ in the
Secretariat, but hinders institutional independence. As part of their diplomatic
career, the seconded diplomats are posted to the APEC Secretariat usually on a
three-year basis and financed by their respective governments rather than the
Secretariat.198 The APEC tasks to which the diplomats are assigned are not
necessarily based on their expertise. Another structural abnormity is that the
APEC executive director has no right to discipline or promote diplomats, al-
though he may ‘occasionally involve’ himself in their evaluation upon respective
ministries’ request.
The APEC Secretariat has been impeded from giving APEC projects
constructive guidance due to limited financial support, professionalism
and institutional memory. Its role is therefore confined to passive coordin-
ation. In practice, APEC’s primary administrative tasks are undertaken by
host economies, committees and working groups. This horizontal designa-
tion of tasks led to ‘a proliferation of uncoordinated projects’ and the frag-
mentation of APEC resources.199 In addition, because of insufficient
analytical capacity, APEC research projects are often ‘outsourced’ to the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which is a tripartite
partnership among governments, businesses and academics.200 Ironically,
Table 1. Selected information on the Secretariats of International Organizations
Organization Annual budget Number of staff
OECD EUR 347 million 2500
WTO CHF 196 million 677
ASEAN USD 15.8 million 260
APEC USD 5 million 60
Sources: OECD Week 2012: Secretariat-General’s Report to Ministers 2012 (2012), at 33; Who
Does What?, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(visited 7 June 2012); World Trade Organization: Annual Report 2012 (2012), at 140; Kavi
Chongkittavorn, ‘ASEAN Secretariat Must Be Empowered’, The Nation, 21 May 2012, http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Asean-Secretariat-must-be-empowered-30182419.html (vis-
ited 1 July 2012); APEC – Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-
Economic-Relations/APEC/5-APEC-FAQs.php (visited 17 June 2012); Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.apec.org/FAQ.aspx (visited 17 June 2012).
197 Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.apec.org/FAQ.aspx (visited 17 June 2012); APEC
Secretariat Report on Key Developments in 2011, 2012/SOM1/SCCP/002, 9–11 February
2012, at 4.
198 Interview with APEC officials [names withheld], 12 March 2012.
199 Ravenhill, above n 23, at 132; McKay et al., above n 181, at 10.
200 For information on APEC-commissioned projects, see Mignon Chan, The Role of PECC in
Support of APEC: Problems and Prospects, paper presented at the ‘APEC Update 2000:
The Role of Institutions in Support of APEC’ conference (2000), at 3 (on file with the
author).
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with similarly limited resources for its Secretariat, the PECC projects
are in fact supported by national committees, many of which are financed
by their governments. This potential conflict of interests makes it doubtful
whether their research projects reflect objective assessments that examine
the shortcomings of governmental measures. These examples highlight
the importance of enhancing the APEC Secretariat’s pragmatic function
by expanding financial support and the number of professionals it
encompasses.201
The reform of the APEC Secretariat has been discussed since 2000 but
has yielded limited results.202 Two noteworthy milestones are the creation of
the fixed-term executive director position and the Policy Support Unit
(PSU). Prior to 2010, the APEC executive directors and the deputy execu-
tive directors were on a rotating basis among 21 members.203 The executive
director came from the economy that hosted the APEC meetings in that year
and the deputy executive director, who would be the next executive director,
came from the next host economy.204 The fact that these ambassador-level
officials led the APEC Secretariat for no more than two years hindered the
implementation of any reform plans. The change to a three-year executive
director position was implemented in 2010 and is expected to strengthen
leadership of the APEC Secretariat.205
The establishment of the PSU in 2008 enhances the APEC Secretariat’s
objective assessment of the APEC’s trade and investment agenda.206 The
PSU’s empirical analyses are of particular importance to APEC’s policy
decisions. The PSU is not yet integrated into the APEC Secretariat and is
structurally distinguishable from the Secretariat. The PSU’s mandate focuses
solely on APEC-related research rather than the implementation of substan-
tive projects. The APEC Secretariat’s budget is based on 21 members’
mandatory contributions, whereas the PSU is supported by voluntary con-
tributions. The increased number of contributors from two to seven major
201 See Richard Feinberg and Joyce Lawrence, ‘Improving APEC’s Coherence’, Paper presented
at the APEC Study Centre Network Conference for APEC 2007 (2006), at 4 (‘An increase
in professional and administrative staff by 50 percent would cost about US$20 million per
year, which is a small fraction of [the budget of the annul leaders’ meetings].’).
202 For example, three policy reports of the APEC International Assessment of Network since
2000 and APEC leaders’ discussions since 2003. McKay et al., above n 181, at 7; APEC
Reform 2006 Deliverables, above n 181.
203 Ravenhill, above n 23, at 131.
204 Ibid.
205 The first fixed-term executive director is Ambassador Muhamad Noor Yacob from Malaysia.
APEC Secretariat, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/APEC-Secretariat.aspx (visited 22 July
2012).
206 Annual Report 2011, APEC Policy Support Unit, Mar. 2012 [PSU Annul Report 2011], at 1.
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economies shows increasing support for the PSU.207 Finally, unlike the
APEC Secretariat, PSU officials have no government affiliation. To maintain
its autonomy, the PSU has independently recruited economics and public
policy-trained professionals from its inception. The Governance Arrangements
authorize the PSU’s mandate to extend to 2013 and the feasibility of its
integration into the APEC Secretariat was discussed.208 The PSU should
become a permanent division within the APEC Secretariat because the
PSU strengthens APEC’s transparency and accountability. As APEC was
originally modeled on the OECD, the PSU will help overcome APEC’s
inability to provide high-quality research and policy recommendations.
A more professionalized APEC Secretariat will increase APEC’s relevance in
economic integration and its comparative advantage over other regional under-
takings. It can further streamline the coordination of the fragmented commit-
tees and working groups that have overlapping mandates. For instance, as
economic and technical cooperation underpins one of APEC’s three pillars,
ECOTECH projects have rapidly proliferated. Although regional economic
integration is the first priority under the funding criteria, only 8% of
APEC-funded ECOTECH projects addressed this end.209 To efficiently utilize
APEC’s resources, the APEC Secretariat should be the gatekeeper to evaluate
their actual performance and recommend that some projects merge or cease.
With the assistance of the enhanced secretariat, APEC can strengthen the
public–private partnership by responding timely to business needs and civil
society.210 Given the escalating Eurozone crisis, an imminent challenge to
APEC is financial cooperation. APEC’s incapability of handling the Asian
financial crisis led to its own credibility crisis. APEC finance ministers’ meet-
ings that began in 1994 achieved no deliverable results.211 To avoid being
marginalized by emerging financial frameworks, APEC should focus on fi-
nancial cooperation from a business perspective. One key task is to address
207 2009 contributors include Australia and Hong Kong and 2011 contributors include
Australia, Japan, the United States, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Ibid at 11;
Annual Report 2009, APEC Policy Support Unit, February 2010, at 13.
208 PSU Annul Report 2011, above n 206, at 2 and 12.
209 APEC Senior Officials’ Report on Economic and Technical Cooperation 2011 (2011), at 23
and 95. See also Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Project Selection and Evaluation: APEC’s Budget
and Management Committee and the Secretariat’, in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), APEC as an
Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Institute, 2003) 73, 80 (arguing that the APEC Secretariat should improve evaluation of
APEC programs).
210 See Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Voluntary Multilateralism and Institutional Modification: The
First Two Decades of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’, 3 The Review of
International Organizations 239 (2008) 247 (‘ABAC would issue periodic reports with
specific recommendations, but would be frustrated by official APEC’s lack of responsiveness
and inability to make hard decisions . . . .’).
211 For information on APEC’s discussions on finance issues, see 1994 APEC Finance
Ministerial Meeting, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Finance/
1994_finance.aspx (visited 22 July 2012).
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the ABAC’s concern about the impact of regulatory requirements of the G20
and Basel III on SMEs’ access to finance.212 This is particularly significant
to the APEC region because more than 90% of the companies are SMEs and
cover 25% of the work force.213
C. Enhanced IAP peer review process
Individual Action Plans, which commenced in 1996, are at the core of the
Manila Action Plan to implement the 2010/2020 target under the Bogor
Goals.214 APEC members report their progress in 15 areas covered under
the Osaka Action Agenda in their respective IAPs, which are subject to peer
review. Comparable systems that ensure transparency include the WTO’s
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the OECD’s peer review
system, conducted by the Economic and Development Review Committee
(EDRC).215 Although all APEC economies are WTO members, only the
USA, Japan, and China are under TPRM review every two years; the re-
maining members are reviewed every four or six years, depending on their
share of global trade.216 In every 18-month cycle, the EDRC also reviews the
economic policy of 11 APEC members, including eight OECD countries
plus China, Indonesia, and Russia.217 APEC’s IAP peer review mechanism
nonetheless applies to all 21 members and covers APEC-designated trade
areas beyond the WTO and the OECD. There are necessary reforms for the
IAP mechanism to make it a more effective monitoring system that ‘hardens’
the soft-law nature of APEC’s concerted unilateral liberalization.
APEC introduced the IAP peer review system to allow additional exertion of
peer pressure in 1998 and involved independent experts who have examined
members’ IAPs since 2002.218 Every three to four years, each APEC member
is required to submit a full IAP and provide an update in intervening years.219
212 Letter to The Honorable Francisco Sanchez, 29 April 2011, in Annex B, APEC Business
Advisory Council Report to APEC Economic Leaders (2011), at 59.
213 The Kyoto Report on Growth Strategy and Finance, 2010/FMM/010, 5–6 November 2010,
at 5.
214 The Individual Action Plan (IAP) and IAP Peer Review, 2011/SOM2/021anx2, 17–18 May
2011 [IAP Peer Review], at 1.
215 Overseeing National Trade Policies: The TPRM, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/
tp_int_e.htm (visited 26 July 2012); Peer Reviews in Economic Surveys, http://www.oecd.
org/site/peerreview/peerreviewsineconomicsurveys.htm (visited 26 July 2012).
216 Overseeing National Trade Policies: The TPRM, above n 215.
217 Peer Review in Economic Surveys: The Role of the EDRC, http://www.oecd.org/site/peerre
view/peerreviewineconomicsurveystheroleoftheedrc.htm (visited 26 July 2012); OECD
Economic Surveys: List by Country, http://www.oecd.org/eco/economicsurveysandcountry
surveillance/oecdeconomicsurveyslistbycountry.htm (visited 28 July 2012).
218 Stages of the IAP peer review process include (i) Origin and Pre-launch (1994–1997),
(ii) Voluntary Peer Review of IAPs (1997–2002), (iii) First Cycle of Enhanced Peer Review
(with report by one independent expert) (2002–2006), and (iv) Second Cycle of Enhanced Peer
Review (with report by two independent experts) (2007–2009). Soesastro, above n 84, at 78.
219 Ibid.
APEC’S Role as a Trans-Regional Economic Architecture 153
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity on M
arch 14, 2013
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
It generally takes 16 months to complete the entire review process.220
The procedure includes the compilation of comments and questions by rep-
resentatives from APEC governments and the ABAC, two experts’ on-site
visits in the country under review, and peer review sessions.221
Based on the IAPs, APEC was able to provide quantitative and qualitative
analysis of the progress towards the Bogor Goals. APEC members subject
themselves to voluntary review for two reasons. First, the review process
helps governments to understand their overall trade policies and consider
the adoption of cutting-edge trade measures such as computerized customs
facilitation.222 From the capacity building perspective, independent experts
may function as policy consultants at a limited cost. Second, in countries
with a complex bureaucracy, egocentrism of decentralized ministries often
poses a political hurdle to structural reform. The policy-makers may utilize
recommendations that APEC reviewers provide as external pressure to over-
come domestic opposition to trade liberalization.223
In 2011, APEC adopted the revised IAP review process to improve the
mechanism. The new process includes the reporting expansion of OAA areas
such as transparency and FTAs, and the PSU’s report on IAP assessments
that will go public.224 The review schedule from 2012 to 2020, the Bogor
Goals’ deadline, is also provided.225 While the operation of the updated
system remains to be seen, additional reforms are essential. For example,
the IAPs’ format inconsistency obscures the actual trade liberalization pro-
cess. Under the positive-list modality, the IAPs only show what measures the
members implemented rather than areas to be improved.226 Despite the IAP
template that was introduced to promote consistency and transparency,
APEC members have a large degree of discretion to list OAA-related regu-
latory changes and other APEC voluntary measures. In some cases, members
even keep reporting areas blank in their IAPs.227 In practice, APEC mem-
bers often copied and pasted their own WTO TPRM reports. The fact
that WTO reports cover additional WTO-plus issues makes the IAP’s
220 For example, IAP Peer Review: Review Teams, Timeline and List of Experts, 2008/SOM1/
014, 2–3 March 2008, at 3.
221 Ibid.
222 IAP Peer Reviews: APEC Member Economies Make Process, 1 March 2007, http://www.
apec.org/Press/Features/2007/0301_IAP_Peer_Reviews_APEC_Member_Economies_Make_
Progress.aspx (visited 1 July 2012).
223 Ibid.
224 The areas to be reports increased to 17. IAP Peer Review, above n 214, at 2.
225 See ibid. (‘Economies would report in: 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018; in 2020, economies
would undertake the final assessment.’).
226 Yamazawa, above n 61, at 13.
227 For example, in its 2010 IAP update, Vietnam did not enter any information on government
procurement, deregulation/regulatory review and dispute mediation. Individual Action Plan
Update for Vietnam for 2010, http://www.apec-iap.org/document/VN_2010_IAP.htm (visited
22 July 2012).
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transparency function largely marginalized.228 Consequently, it is recom-
mended that the IAP process incorporate a more detailed reporting require-
ment with the negative-listing approach.229
The APEC Secretariat’s minimum support in the IAP review process led
to incoherent methodologies used in review reports, thus counteracting the
monitoring effectiveness. The use of independent experts ensures objective
assessment. The two experts for each country under review are nominated
by APEC members and selected by the review teams.230 They are often
academics with limited APEC and industry experience. The composition
of experts varies each time. Given their diverse expertise, experts pose dif-
ferent questions during on-site visits and their drafted study reports also vary
in format and content. Some review reports follow the ‘no name, no shame’
custom by explaining that the IAP peer review process should be more
lenient than the TPRM as the former does not aim at ‘quick harmoniza-
tion’.231 This interpretation should be qualified. I do not challenge that the
Bogor Goals contain constructive ambiguity, but to ensure the OAA prin-
ciples of comprehensiveness and comparability, utilizing certain benchmarks
in assessment is necessary. Such benchmarks may be based on APEC-
developed soft-law guidance such as the Non-Binding Investment Principles
or derive from the scoreboard system modeled on the mechanisms adopted
by the EU and ASEAN.232
Under the TPRM, the Trade Policy Review Division of the WTO
Secretariat prepares the drafted Secretariat Report based on the
Government Report and on-site visits by experienced WTO officials. The
OECD has a comparable mechanism under which its secretariat prepares
the drafted Economic Survey with assessment and recommendations.233 In
comparison, the APEC Secretariat plays a rather limited role in the peer
review process other than compiling and forwarding materials. The one to
two-day review sessions under the WTO and the OECD also cover more
substantive issues than the APEC’s review sessions, which often form part of
228 For instance, when compared China’s IAP update with its WTO trade policy review report
in the same year, ‘additional’ information the former provides are primarily limited to APEC
initiatives such as paperless trading and ABTC. Individual Action Update for China for
2010, http://www.apec-iap.org/document/PRC_2010_IAP.htm (visited 22 July 2012); Trade
Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: China, WT/TPR/S/230, 26 April 2010.
229 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘APEC’s New IAP Process’, 17 February 2012, http://www.pecc.org/blog/
2012/02/17/apec%E2%80%99s-new-iap-process/ (visited 1 July 2012).
230 See generally IAP Peer Review: Review Teams, Timeline and List of Experts, above n 220.
231 Yamazawa, above n 229; Yue Pau Woo, ‘A Review of the APEC Individual Action Plan Peer
Review Process’, in Mark Borthwick et al. (eds), The Future of APEC and Regionalism in Asia
Pacific: Perspectives from the Second Track (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2005) 73, 77.
232 See generally Internal Market Scoreboard, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/inter-
nal_market/score/index_en.htm#score (visited 30 July 2012); Charting Progress towards
Regional Economic Integration: ASEAN Economic Community Scoreboard (2010).
233 MacDuff and Woo, above n 12, at 57.
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SOMs and last only 90 minutes for each economy.234 Based on the analysis
above, APEC should learn from the WTO and OECD lessons and enhance
the IAP review peer review process, which is essential to the Bogor Goals
and an FTAAP.
V. CONCLUSION
By assessing APEC’s role as a de facto institution, this article examined a
unique case study in international economic law and trade policy. The article
provided the most up-to-date examination of APEC’s evolution as a trans-
regional economic architecture and its implications for fast-growing Asian
regionalism. It argued that while APEC has contributed to trade liberaliza-
tion and facilitation, its soft-law mechanism should undergo reforms. Such
reforms are vital to meet challenges posed by the fragmentation of regional
FTAs and to accelerate toward the Bogor Goals so as to create an FTAAP.
Tackling next-generation trade and investment issues will also escalate
APEC’s relevance amid competing regional undertakings.
The divergent agendas of APEC’s key stake-holding countries may have
handicapped APEC’s development. Nonetheless, APEC’s incremental
achievements in WTO-plus arenas can be demonstrated through reinvigorat-
ing ITA negotiations, promoting supply-chain facilitation, and enacting gui-
dance on trade and investments measures. Marching into its third decade,
APEC should become an active incubator for the pathways to an FTAAP,
including the TPP and the ‘ASEAN plus N’ framework. Therefore, to
remedy APEC’s institutional weaknesses, this article called for transforming
APEC into a full-fledged organization by ratifying the APEC Charter, which
will enable it to introduce binding resolutions. APEC’s institutional capacity
should be fortified by strengthening the PSU’s mandate and integrating the
proliferating ECOTECH projects. Furthermore, the enhanced IAP review
process will increase the transparency of the APEC members’ trade and
investment liberalization processes and APEC, as an institution, can compe-
tently complement the WTO and harmonize regional FTAs. These structural
improvements will reinvigorate the public-private partnership in trans-Pacific
integration and buttress APEC’s position as an indispensable framework
under the multilateral trading system.
234 The IAP review sessions usually take place in the first three Senior Officials’ Meetings. Ibid;
Interview with a former IAP independent expert (name withheld), 4 May 2012.
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Annex 2. Selected list of abbreviations
ABAC APEC Business Advisory Council
ABTC APEC Business Travel Card
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
CAP Collective Action Plan
CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CUL Concerted Unilateral Liberalization
EAEC East Asia Economic Caucus
ECFA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
e-Co Electronic Certificates of Origin
ECOTECH Economic and Technical Cooperation
EDRC Economic and Development Review Committee
EVSL Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
HS Harmonized System
IAP Individual Action Plan
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ITA Information Technology Agreement
NTB Non-Tariff Barriers
OAA Osaka Action Agenda
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PSU Policy Support Unit
SOM Senior Officials’ Meeting
TFAP Trade Facilitation Action Plan
The P4 Agreement The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement
TILF Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TPRM Trade Policy Review Mechanism
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